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## Nigeria Government Perception on Boko Haram and Search for National Security

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### **Abstract:**

For more than a decade Boko Haram insurgency had remained a threat to Nigeria's state. The research 'Nigeria's perception on Boko Haram and search for national security' was designed to uncover why Boko Haram insurgency survived thus far. The research was guided by the following questions: who are Boko Haram? What is Nigeria's perception of Boko Haram? And what are the solutions put in place? Accidental interview sampling techniques were employed with content analytical framework due to data sources. It discovered that Boko Haram is a radical Islamic insurgent group seeking to abolish the civic government and establish Sharia law, its sources of finance include among others members' contributions and members cut across West Africa. Nigeria's state perceived Boko Haram as a mere political problem. The paper recommended that Boko Haram should be seen as a well-equipped Islamic insurgent capable of topping the civil and inclusive system. Defensive and war counter-terrorism should be employed in addition to unbiased responsive leadership.

**Keywords:** Security, National Security, Terrorism, Insurgency, Nigeria

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### **Introduction**

An eye does not see what it did not know. How individual, society, nation or nation-state sees a phenomenon determined how they respond to. There is a cordial relationship between what one knows and what he/she will see. Constructivism emphasizes the social construct of reality, (Robert and Georg, 2013).

Human relations, including international relations, consist of thoughts and ideas and not essentially of material conditions, or forces (Robert and Georg, 2013). Ibid cited Wendt that 500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korea nuclear weapons because 'the British are friends and North Korea are not' (Wendt, 1995, p. 73). This can be deduced

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that the British material condition does not seem because the British are not known as an enemy while the insignificant of North Korea is known and U.S eyes see it.

Social construct in the pre-modern state system defined the individual or community response. One such area that remains of interest to both scholars and society is security. There was a paradigm shift from numerous perceptions of security to national security propel by the Westphalia treaty of 1648, (Shehu and Garba, 2020, p. 1). Henceforth, state perception and action ought to be the summation of its populace.

On 1<sup>st</sup> October 1960, Nigeria assumed statehood and the task of being an eye of all Nigerians. For her to continue existing, it must ensure national security. The state perception and responses ought to be final. This did not deny tribal, religion, ethnic, group, etc. agitation. And such agitation sometimes constitutes threat to national security.

One such agitation that exposed Nigerian's state strength and weakness, lens, and the response was the Biafra quest for independence which metamorphose into civil war from 1967 to 1970. The state perception of the state was a police affair and corresponding responds as a dialogue than military (Izah, 1991). Peace, security and unify national life were restored via a military campaign. Although Gowon maintained in words the police affairs: no victor – no loser.

While the forgone was going on, in 1966, the first significant use of arms in the Niger delta occurred, when Isaac Adaka Boro formed an Ijaw group, the Niger Delta Volunteer force, and declared a republic (Asuni, 2009:7). Although the federal government has brought it under tame within few days. The seed has germinated into many groups that later unified under the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

(Asuni, 2009, p. 5) assert that "MEND is constantly changing mass groups, some of the criminally motivated, others politically and ideologically driven. It is difficult to distinguish between them". What united them is the grievance about the exploitation and neglect of their region, pollution, wiping sources of livelihood (fishing and farming), and providing few jobs in return, (ibid). In 2015, while I was in the region, on several occasions pollution of the environment resulted in black rainfall. The federal government sees the lack of development of the region as the inhabitant's term it and respond in 2008 by creating the ministry of Niger Delta Affairs for development and youth empowerment. No nation can afford to treat with levity the security of its territorial integrity and its people (Anthony, 2014, p. 483). Allswel (2014, p. 218) posited that Nigeria is a nation at war with itself. Boko Haram has been one conducted its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence, (Anthony, 2014, p. 482). Since July 2009, Boko Haram has remained a threat to Nigeria's state due to its violent campaign on national and international persons and properties.

The foregoing midwife the research "Nigeria's perception on Boko Haram and search for National security". For more than a decade of its violence campaign, the group is yet to be well defined and hence government responses are not certain. This informed who are the Boko haram? What is the Nigerian government's perception of Boko Haram? What are the solutions put in place? And what will be the possible lasting solution to the Boko Haram menace?

#### Counter-Terrorism Models

Counterterrorism consists of actions or strategies aimed at preventing terrorism from escalating, controlling the damage from

terrorist attacks that do occur, and ultimately seeking to eradicate terrorism in a given context, (Simon, 2010). Terrorism has been one of the insurgents' tools, and insurgency is characterized by an unequal power struggle between the state (often stronger) and insur-

gents (weak) to gain legitimacy. State perception of the actors defined her response(s).

In this light, Ami Pedahzur as cited in Simon (2010) outline four counter-terrorism model which includes defensive, reconciliatory, criminal-justice and war:

**Table 1:**  
*counter-terrorism models*

MODELS	DEFENSIVE	RECONCILIATORY	CRIMINAL- JUSTICE	WAR
General features	Terrorism is a physical and psychological threat	Terrorism is a political problem	Terrorism is a crime	Terrorism is an act of war
Goal and method of the state	Protecting potential targets and victims	Addressing the root cause of terrorism	Arrest and punish terrorists according to the rule of law	Eliminate terrorism through military force
Legal aspect	Correspond in most case to the elements of liberal democracy with exception when practice undermine civil liberties	Correspond to the rule of law	Correspond with the law and is subject to constant judicial oversight	Correspond to laws of war, or may ignore the law entirely
Agents	Police, private security companies, firefighters and paramedics, other state and municipal agencies	Politicians, policy-makers, brokers, diplomats	Police and the criminal justice system	Intelligence and military units

Source: Simon (2010) what is the difference between counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism?  
<https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/6037>

### **The Boko Haram**

"Nigeria is a nation at war with itself. The situation is grave" (Allswel, 2014, p. 218). Martin (2008, p. 47) commenting on the actors of Xinjiang's insurgency observed that "the insurgency is primarily an indigenous affair with many contributing and enabling socio-political factors. Unrest and social violence are not phenomena present in

Xinjiang alone. Hassan (2014, p. 14) posited that "by all indications, Nigeria is facing serious challenges. The country is now home to terrorists and insurgents with their dastardly incessant killing destruction and abduction.

### **Christen**

The foregoing describes Nigeria's state security state due to many actors but focused on

Boko Haram insurgency. Firstly, there is no accurate account of when, why, who, and how the group was named Boko Haram. Albani (2009) credited newsmen for naming the group Boko Haram which centers on their propaganda, speeches, anti-west, and any things that are not in turn to their Quran understanding. While Benjamin (2019, p. 14) saw the combination of Hausa (Boko) and Arabic (Haram) words. The Arabic word 'Haram' simply means sin, forbidden, or sacrilege.

According to Oftedal (2013) as cited in Benjamin (2019, p. 14) in classical Hausa language, 'Boko' literally means 'deception', 'deceit'. It is used to describe the formal education system of the colonial period that was associated with Christian missionaries as seen as a disguise for evangelism and western belief. This 'boko' etymological standpoint, presumed western education or as commonly referred to 'formal education, as western culture or western civilization and Christianity are but one. Accepting one entails accepting all. And such brings the question of why some people studied in a formal education setting and maintaining their culture and religion? Albani's (2009) opinion is that although some practices in secular education are un-Islamic, Muslims should be enrolled in it and avoid those practices.

In the words of Alhassan and Lateef (2017, p. 125), the name was derived from an anti-western stance of the group. This is a valid argument because the group has claimed in many of its press releases to be anti-government and anything that has the semblance of western education. One can deduce that Boko Haram has not thrown the child with the bathing water by communication technology and the weapon they use and this made them hypocritical (Hassan, 2014, p. 12).

Last but not least to acknowledge is northern university students' jokes. Accord-

ing to Alhassan and Lateef (2017, p. 125), some believed it resulted from the common saying among northern university students in the past to jokes and relieve themselves of academic stress and tension. On this note, Albani (2009) was not in support of but observed that many students with poor academic performance and school dropouts found refuge in the movement.

To this end, Boko Haram has other many names which they either called themselves or they are called. Few to outline are the Yusu-fiya (follower of Yusuf), Taliban, Afhaganistan, Sha'abah, Salafiyatun Jihad among others (Alhassan and Lateef, 2017; Shaibu and Obayomi, 2017, Alabani, 2009). Albani (2009) further observed that they used many names to hide their identity and confused the Nigerian government and Taliban to threaten Nigerian security agencies because the collective forces of the western military have not found it easy to tame the Taliban. Although their ideological and goal name or what Alhassan and Lateef (2017) termed as original name remained "Jama'atu ahlus sunnah lidda wati wal-jihad" meaning "association of people committed to the Prophet's tradition and propagation of Islam". (Jonah and Michael, 2014, Benjamin, 2019, Raji, n.d.; Alhassan and Lateef, 2017). Their goal is to impose Islam (submission to the will of Allah) and Sharia (which in Arabic does not mean 'law' but 'the way' or 'path way' – implying something much broader than law) in northern Nigeria, Nigeria, and then West Africa (Anthony, 2014; Glenn, 2015; Alhassan and Lateef, 2017; Ekpo and Mavalla, 2017; Albani, 2009).

### **Founder and Foundation**

The movement Jama'atu ahlus sunnah lidda wati wal-jihad or as is well and commonly address "Boko Haram" is generally believed,

accepted without question that was founded by late Muhammed Yusuf. Little attention is given to the person and personality of Muhammed Yusuf, so also little is known about him. While on the source(s) of inspiration, some have investigated/search/research but many of their efforts were without erudition to eductive.

One of the works that have attempted to find out who is Muhammed Yusuf was carried by late Albani Muhammed Auwal. He discovered that Muhammed Yusuf is by tribe Barebare of Borno state but was born in Yobe state in the 1970s. He speaks Hausa, Barebare, and Fulani language fluently. On Quran or Islamic learning, Muhammed Yusuf did '*Sangaya*' and one of his teachers was his father. On this note, Albani (2009) concluded that Muhammed Yusuf lacks the Quran scientific approach knowledge which was the foundation of the crisis in his life.

The father of Muhammed Yusuf was one of the anti-western education thirty 30 years back before Boko Haram (Albani, 2009; Ismail et al, 2017). Originally, his father was from the Niger Republic and was killed around Riziyani Zaka outside Kano in the 1980s when he went for reinforcement for the Maitatsine war. The Yusuf in Muhammed Yusuf is not the biological father of Muhammed Yusuf. It's his uncle –brother to his mother who carried him to Maiduguri and stayed with him after the demise of his father.

When Muhammed Yusuf was about 19 to 21 years old, he was exposed to Ibrahim Al-zakzaki doctrine i.e. Shia for about five years. This suggests a link between the Boko Haram and Shia movement. The nature of their respective arsenal, anti-government, and confrontation with Nigeria's security agencies, attest. In the words of Ekpo and Mavalla, (2017, p. 12) "Boko Haram, an Islamic militant group, is said to have metamor-

phosed from the sectarian group known as Shabaab, established by Lawan Abubakar in 1995' and Muhammed Yusuf by 1999 had assumed full leadership of the group".

As a child, Muhammed Yusuf has not only inherited the anti-government ideology from his biological father as Albani (2009) observed but a living witness. Some of the interviewees in addition to Herbert and Husaini (2018), Ismail et al (2017), Allswel (2014), Albani (2009), and Rilwan (2017) saw Maitatsine as a forerunner and source of inspiration to Boko Haram. Their claim is validated in the violent attacks against government security agencies, government establishment, Christians, Muslims who preach against them, anti-west as was the case of Maitatsine. On the other hand, Shaibu and Obayomi (2017, p. 155) "Yusuf based his teaching on the works of Ibn Taymiyya, after whom he named his Mosque in Maiduguri, and who has influenced other modern radical Islamist government".

On international inspiration, Glenn (2015) argued 'today, all major jihadist groups can directly or indirectly trace their root right back to the founder of Muslim brotherhood'. While in Africa – Egypt (ibid) states that "in the 1930s, Hassan al-Banna came along preaching a message that resonated. He said misery was caused by two things: western influence, and the Jews. 'Allah is our goal, the Prophet our model, Quran our constitution, the jihad our path and death for the sake of Allah the loftiest of our wishes', al-Banna proclaimed". He cited Boko Haram as the apostle of such an idea in Nigeria.

More so, Albani (2009) saw the writing of Saidu Kutub as the global source of inspiration to Boko Haram which landed Africa in Egypt and then Sudan. Bashir of Sudan in the 1980s brought Saidu Kutub idea to Kano (Nigeria). In 1987 they moved to Mak local

government of Niger state (Nigeria) and established a town and named it Dar-Islam. The central idea is staging a global jihad. Glenn (2015) identified three communities: the Dar-Islam 'house of Islam', Dar-al Sulh referred to non-Muslim nations that had agreed to a peace treaty with Muslims, often including payment of tribute, and Dar al-Harb 'house of war'.

In the words of Albani (2009), Muhammed imported his ideology from Algeria, specifically from Jaba'ah. The Jaba'ah assisted Muhammed Yusuf with the idea, weapons, training, and manpower. According to Ham (2012) as cited by Jonah and Michael (2014) it was observed that the terrorist group was aligned with other foreign terrorist organizations like the al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, al-Qaeda in Arabic Peninsula, Al-Shaba'ah, and al-Qaeda senior leader in Pakistan. Boko Haram press releases have validated some of this claimed.

"Anti-western education is an ideology which Muhammed Yusuf believed it, grow up with, accepted and lost his life for", (Albani, 2009). Muhammed Yusuf was killed when he was in police custody, (Albani, 2009; Adam, 2013 and Ekpo & Mavalla, 2017, p. 12). Albani (2009) argued that the reasons why Muhammed Yusuf was killed are: first that he was killed thinking by killing him, it will end the movement; secondly few days before he was arrested, as a combined force with citizens of Algeria, (Jaba'ah), Niger, Somalia, Mauritania and Nigeria, they have suffered the Nigerians security agencies, hence they don't want him to be set free by a court and continue given them top time, and lastly in order not to expose some people.

Only the third reason was achieved. In the words of Albani (2009) "in a short time, they will announce who will lead them because they have weapons and manpower. Hence, killing Muhammed Yusuf is not an end to

Boko Haram and they have plans on how to continue no matter what will happen. As predicted by Albani (2009), Abubakar Shekau was announced as the new leader of the group and since 2009 to date (2020) he is leading Boko Haram. Although some interviewees argued that the first Shekau was killed and Abubakar Shekau is just like a title/position like Emir or president.

To this end, Boko Haram acquired weapons such as General purpose Machine Guns, Rocket Propelled Grenades, Rocket Launchers, AK47 Rifles, SAM-7, Anti-Aircraft, and Anti-Tank Missiles and bombs. It also acquired the rudimentary technology of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), (Ibiang, 2018:38). Many of the stated weapons enter Nigeria through the Niger Republic unchecked by Nigeria's Immigration and Custom. 'Because is a standing tradition, Buzu Transporting death palm to Nigeria', (Albani, 2009). There are no certain sources of finance. According to Albani (2009), the Muhammed Yusuf account was used in sending money to them from outside Nigeria and members have sold their properties and donate the money to the movement. While to Adam (2013), Boko Haram is involved in bank robberies, and the Northern Muslim elite are accused of sponsoring Boko Haram.

#### Target and Phases of Operation

In any society, the weaker the system for distracting and disciplining the youth, particularly young males, the greater the violence of all kinds, including the political, (Steven, 2012, p. 40). When insurgency start, Martin (2008:4) observed that "if the insurgents are not killed or captured, they will continue planning and attacking; yet to stop the insurgency society must reject it. Although Muhammed Yusuf was captured, killed but his followers regroup and persist with attacking their target.

According to Oladayo (2014, p. 149), Boko Haram target includes Mosques (more especially the one with Islamic clerics that opposed their ideology) churches, Market (where they carried goods), motor packs, houses (especially of people who opposed or revealed information about them), clinic (in which they took medical equipment and drugs) and schools one of which took 250 schools girls in April 2014. Zagga et al (2017) Boko Haram target points include international organizations, security agencies, educational institutions, and places of worship. While to Akpa and Adeoye (2014, pp. 151-152) Boko Haram insurgents launched attacks on churches, schools, police stations, other public institutions, and international establishments. They further observed that 'the bombing of the United Nations office in Abuja is perhaps what the insurgents used to gain global recognition as they are now listed among terrorist organizations by the United States and its allies.

Furthermore, Adam (2013, p. 2) Boko Haram target those who preach against them, inform them, and are also involved in bank robberies and prison breaks. Whereas to Albani (2009), they attacked Islamic scholars who preach against them, police stations, army barracks, and overthrow the government. To this end, Allswel (2014:230) police, military, churches, others places of worship, schools, international agencies, markets squares, and other highly-public are their target. Interviewees concur with the forgone and caution that not been attacked at a time does not mean being immune from their attacks.

From the rate of attack and leadership of Boko haram, scholars have proposed two phases of Boko Haram activities. Such scholars include Salisu (2015) as cited in Alhassan and Lateef (2017) the phases are peaceful and violent. The peaceful was under the lea-

dership of the late Muhammed Yusuf which was less violent and limited to Nigeria, although preparation for the violence. And the violence under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau and expanded operations to West Africa (Niger, Cameroon, and Chad).

#### Peaceful Phase of Boko Haram

There are claimed that cannot be validated at this junction that Boko Haram was established in 1988, (Alhassan and Lateef, 2107). Boko haram is a radical Islamic group that seeks to abolish the system of government and establish sharia law, came into the lime-light in 2002 in Kanam (Yobe state) with the name Yobe Taliban or Salafiyatu. Thereafter it was noticed in Gwoza (Borno state), (Adu and Osadola, 2018; Alhassan and Lateef, 2017; Anthony, 2014 and Benjamin, 2019). In the word of Anthony (2014, p. 482), the group conducted its operation more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence.

The first seven years of activities consonance Simons (2010) first strategic choice terrorism follows which he terms as disorientation. He further argued that disorientation seeks to sow within a population a general sense of insecurity and distract from the legitimacy of existing state structures, often through random acts of violence that prey upon the civilian population in general. Some interviewees noted that it was during this period that they buy items which they later used in making local bombs and such items include old wall clock, old iron, old black and white television, old oil lamp, etc. which some cost even a million naira.

In the words of Albani (2009) and Alhassan and Lateef (2017), Muhammed Yusuf started spreading his teaching at the Mosques of Ndume which is along Danbuwa road in Maiduguri. And what gave him access to the Ndume Mosque was that the Imam of the

Mosque and others in Maiduguri went to Medina University for further studies. He set up a religious center called Markez which includes mosques and schools that poor Muslim families in Nigeria and neighboring countries sent their children and it later served as a recruitment ground for later jihadists, (Alhassan and Lateef, 2017).

With the return of those that went for further studies at Medina University, he was sent away. This action generated hatred between Muhammed Yusuf and his followers and others Imams. From Ndume Mosque, he went to railway quarters and stayed in his father-in-law's house, (Albani, 2009). Following the first confrontation with government security in July 2009 on helmet law, Muhammed Yusuf sent an open letter to the federal government with the threat of jihad declaration, (Alhassan and Lateef, 2017).

#### Violent Phase of Boko Haram

This phase is in agreement with Simon's (2010) second and third terrorist strategic choice method – target response and gaining legitimacy. By target response, it seeks prompt a disproportionately harsh collective reprisal from the government, to radicalize the affected population and won international legitimacy, or to wrest political concessions. And gaining legitimacy is where the terrorist group seeks to transfer legitimacy from the government to its cause – through skillful manipulation of the media such as the internet. At this stage, ideology becomes crucial.

After the clashed of a motor bike helmet, on 28<sup>th</sup> July 2009, the Nigerian Army launched an offensive attack against Muhammed Yusuf's compound and a nearby Mosque use by the sect members in Maiduguri (Alhassan and Lateef, 2017 and Albani, 2009). Albani (2009) further asserts that the Nigerian Army apprehended Muhammed Yusuf without any weapon, injury, and in

sound health, although within the five days uprising they suffered Nigerian securities agencies with the help of Jaba'ah members from Algeria. Alhassan and Lateef (2017) cited Murtada (2013), Muhammed Yusuf was killed in the violence while in police custody and this brought an end to the five days uprising.

As Albani (2009) predicted that Boko Haram will announce her new leader, the sect suspended its activities for a while but regroup and re-emerged in 2010 under the new leadership of Abubakar Shekau and new alliance, (Alhassan and Lateef, 2017). Since the rise of the new leadership, the attacks increase in frequency and intensity (ibid). It declared areas in Nigeria under its control as a new caliphate with strict Islamic code and expanded attack to the Niger Republic, Cameroon, and Chad.

#### Organizational/ Department

The following six organizations/department is deduced from Shaibu and Obayomi (2017):

SHURA COUNCIL is the ruling and highest decision-making body of Boko Haram. Substantiated that the shura council has an 'Emir' heads of about thirty (30) persons and they oversee the activities of a cell of militant focused upon a specific geographical area.

PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT consists of a team charged with the responsibility of recruiting and training new members. They use many means in recruiting new members from university teachers and students etc. who cut across Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. One such method is given loans without repayment channels and thereafter people have to donate themselves as suicide bombers, (Shehu and Baiyi, 2020).

OPERATIONAL DEPARTMENT is consist of suicide bombers, a specialist in intelli-



gence gathering and researching possible target and modes of operations, a specialist in planting bombs at targeted sites; those trained as ground troops to repel security agent and other counteractions against the sect in armed duels.

The manufacturing department is in charge of bomb-making as well as the fixing of explosives for suicide bombers and bomb planting. This department has been in operation even before Boko Haram turned to be violent. In the words of *Malama Zainab* a resident of Maiduguri, the manufacturing department got elements for bombs and another explosive making from the old black and white television, wall ring clock, old iron, old oil lamp, etc. which they buy. On the location for the sale, she says that she doesn't know but the *baban bola* (i.e. people who buy old items from people) known where to sell those items.

The public enlightenment department they are in charge of outside communication including all email, 'you tube' and other video coverage. This like others departments, contradict anti-western education and confirmed graduate and technicians membership of Boko Haram.

The welfare department handles the health care needs of members and the families of suicide bombers surviving wives and children. Their function gave two motivations: first, those who died will be rewarded by Allah in the hereafter and on earth, their families and relatives will be taken care of by the welfare department.

#### Causes and Recruitment

The causes and mode of recruitment in Boko Haram are symbiotic. Firstly, the Nigerian government's perspective on the causes of the Boko haram insurgency. On 18 March 2014, for the first time the National Security Adviser (NSA) and Nigeria's government

have these to say. What we have learned is that there is not one particular path that leads to terrorism. Such paths include poverty, joblessness, prolonged unresolved conflicts, social injustice, a growing youth bulge, unfulfilled desire for self-actualization, wanting to belong, individual grievances, and an identity deficit, one that confuses and creates a situation of conflict in identities based are religion tribe or region.

According to Adu and Osadola (2018), the causes of the Boko Haram insurgency are poor leadership, corruption, and religious misapprehension. While Charas (2015) concurred with Adu and Osadola (2018) on poor leadership and corruption, further argued that government policy, poverty, and unemployment are drivers of Boko haram insurgency. In the same vein, Jonah and Michael (2014) observed that poverty especially because it's severely unequal distribution among nations. More so, a large number of youth in the north are unregulated education system where all they learn is the Arabic language (Al-majiri). While to Shane (2009) Boko Haram terrorism is caused by poverty, unemployment, discrimination, and distressing feelings.

Allswel (2014) noted religious and ideological discontent as a cause of Boko Haram insurgency in addition to established discrimination, poverty, and unemployment. Oladayo (2014) agrees on unemployment, corruption, high rate of poverty, religious factors and further posited socio-economic and political as causes of Boko Haram terrorism. While to Raji (n.d) religious extremism, perceived oppression, poverty and ignorance, government policy and leadership style, and strategic perspective as causes of terrorism. To this end, Egbefo and Salihu (2014) writing on internal security causes in Nigeria as causes by lack of good governance and accountability. Poor nature and scope of eco-

conomic development; rapid population growth, electoral fraud, the growing rate of poverty and hunger; high rate of illiteracy and consequence of corruption and unethical practice in Nigeria.

According to Shehu and Baiyi (2020), Boko Haram gave a loan without repayment channel in Mubi. After the beneficiary has spent the money, they were asked to repay. Alternative of given back money is donating oneself as a member of Boko Haram. Herbert and Hussaini (2018) and interviewees, abductions and kidnapping are recruitment methods of Boko Haram. Boko Haram forced people in some areas of Borno and in other instances young men or boys have been paid to carry out attacks or burn schools. Is alleged ECOMOG members – the political thug (not the West Africa military force) of former Borno state governor, Ali Modu Sheriff – have been recruited into Boko Haram, after ECOMOG was dismantled by governor Kashim Shettima, (Adam 2013).

According to Albani (2009), frustrated students due to poor academic performance or finance were given Boko Haram as an alternative and solution to their predicament and due to poverty while some supported Boko Haram for political ambition after the democratic government is overthrow (ibid). In the words of Anthony (2014), Yusuf was able to recruit membership from numerous unemployed youth whose situation has made them dissatisfied with the state. And also took advantage of the irresponsible leadership of all levels of government, unemployment, poverty, corruption, and insecurity.

Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism and Search for National Security

Section 2, sub-section 1, of the Terrorism (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2013, state that the office of the National Security Adviser (in this Act referred to as "ONSA")

shall be the coordinating body for all security and enforcement agencies under this Act and shall:

- A. Provide support to all relevant security intelligence, law enforcement agencies, and military services to prevent and combat acts of terrorism in Nigeria;
- B. Ensure the effective formulation and implementation of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria;
- C. Build capacity for the effective discharge of the functions of all relevant security, relevant, law enforcement and military services under this Act or any other law on terrorism in Nigeria; and
- D. Do such other acts or things that are necessary for the effective performance of the functions of the relevant security and enforcement agencies under this Act.

On this premise, this section condenses Nigeria's perception of Boko Haram and search for national security in the light of the government as is commonly known or the state. First to highlight are the responses prior aforementioned Act of 2011 as Amended 2013. Albani (2009) observed that Nigeria security agencies, Division of state service (DSS) in particular have put much effort into investigating Boko Haram. In accord Adam (2013, p. 2) "the Nigerian government, have arrested Muhammed Yusuf, the then leader of Boko Haram multiple times – he was bailed each time – was well aware of Boko Haram and their activities". With this foreknowledge of Boko Haram and grace to contain it, before it becomes violent. Akpand, Ekanem, and Adeoye (2014, p. 152) described the government's response to Boko

Haram insurgency as 'has been reactionary rather than proactive.

Following the Borno state government motor Cycling helmet law, on 28 July 2009, Boko Haram members clashed with national security agents. This gave birth to five days of uprising and security attacks on Muhammed Yusuf and his followers. The offensive attack and defensive of July 2009 came to an end with the non-judiciary killing of Muhammed Yusuf while in police custody (Albani, 2009; Alhassan and Lateef, 2017; Ekpo and Mavalla, 2017). State of emergency was declared in Borno state. With this development, they suspended their activities but regroup and re-emerged in 2010 under the new leadership of Abubakar Shekau, (Alhassan and Lateef, 2017). At this re-emergence, their activities engulf the north-eastern states of Nigeria thus intensify in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe state. Akpan, Ekanem, and Adeoye (2014) assert that hope lies in the fact that a state of emergency has been declared in (Adamawa, Borno, and the Yobe States) inhabited by the insurgent group, and government troops have launched a sustained offensive against the insurgent group.

Former President Goodluck Jonathan set up an administrative panel and invited the insurgents for amnesty but they bluntly refused to meet with the government (Akpan, Ekanem and Adeoye, 2014) and they established that they have not committed any wrong worth of amnesty, what they are doing is the work of Allah, Shekau. Just as "insurgency changes in consonance with the political, economic, social and technical condition of the global society" Hassan (2014:10) so also counter-insurgency. A joint operation of all security agencies was set up, code-named "Operation Zaman Lafiya "and "Joint Task Force".

These operations set up a roadblock to fish out Boko Haram members and among others cut the supply of first weapons and later food and medical provisions, (interviewees; Akpan, Ekanem and Adeoye, 2014). The need to set of international Joint task Force Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) was necessitated by the expansion of Boko Haram activities to other West African countries via Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Operation Zaman Lafiya was dismantled and put in motion the present counter-insurgency "Operation Lafiya Dole" under the command of Lt- General Tukur Buratai, (Ibiang, 2018:38).

On 28 August 2019, President Muhammadu Buhari pronounce the "EX\_SIFT response' policy. The overall objective is to "ensure a peaceful and secured country in the interest of our national security". It is expected that the exercise will promote inter-agency cooperation and increase preparedness to address trans-border security challenges such as terrorism, arm banditry, smuggling, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and among others enhance national economic growth. Central to EX-SWIFT is border closed which is to be implemented under the office of the national security adviser (ONSA) – in the person of Major-General Muhammed Babagana Mangano by Nigeria's customs service (NCS) and Nigeria's Immigration Service (NIS) in collaboration with the Armed forces of Nigeria (AFN) as well as the Nigeria police force (NPF) and other security and intelligence agencies, (Oghenahogie, 2019; Shehu and Garba, 2020).

In the light of the power bestowed on the National Security Adviser by Terrorism (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2013 and the need for an economic turnaround initiative in the aftermath of the state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states, on 18 March 2014, the National Security Adviser (Col.

Dasuki Sambo) roll out Nigeria soft approach to counter-terrorism. The soft approach focus on:

1. Build up the capacity of government institutions and relevant security and para-military agencies on global best practices on preventing, dealing with individuals/groups involved in radicalization that leads to terrorism;
2. Counter extremist narratives through words and deeds while promoting national values
3. Engaging and partnering with states, local government, civil society, and communities to counter radicalization; and
4. Work with federal and state agencies involved in economic development, job creation, and poverty alleviation to explore their roles in effecting a robust prevent program.

The soft approach to counter-terrorism gave birth to the prison program, operation safe corridor (OPSC), and establishment of the North-East Development Commission, (Bukarti & Bryson, 2019; Ekpo and Mavalla, 2017; interviewees). In an attempt to counter terrorism from its root causes, the second and fourth streams of the soft approach to counter-terrorism, seek partnership of all tiers of governments, communities, and international partners. The bill was presented at the Senate in May 2015 by Senator Abdul-Aziz Murtala Nyako, a senator representing Adamawa's central constituency of Adamawa state, (Ekpo and Mavalla, 2017, p. 13). In 2017 the presidential initiative for the Northeast (PINE) was replaced with the North-East Development Commission (Establishment) Act, 2017. On the functions of the commission part II, 8(1) state that "the commission shall: (a) formulate policies and guidelines

for interventions in the development of the North East Zone".

Part II, 8(I b) " cause the North-East Zone to be surged to ascertain the extent of loss or destruction and embark upon measures that are necessary for proper planning and implementation of psychical and socio-economic reconstruction of the zone". VI of the Act part II, (Ib) state that "requirements for the re-orientation of youth and out of school children including modernization of schools and Almajiri education". From needs assessment, the commission is to make a plan referred to "Master Plan" in the Act, 8 (I c). Ekpo and Mavalla, (2017) recommended that the bill be granted utmost attention and implementation as a coordinating umbrella for both the 'carrot' or soft approach and the 'stick' or hard campaigns.

De-radicalisation at the prison, two prisons were selected and equally training for 60 prison psychologists and training for prison guards in the handling of terror suspects, (Dasuki, 2014). According to Bukarti and Bryson (2019) in 2014, a prison program aimed at combating religious ideology and offering vocational training commences in Kuje prison, Federal Capital Territory. Participants are fighters convicted of violent extremism offenses, or inmates on or awaiting trial for the time been in prison, (ibid.). Interviewees raise questions on trial for the suspected Boko Haram undercover and lack of information as to judgment and their way about.

The soft approach to counter-terrorism, De-radicalisation, Rehabilitation, and reintegration (DRR) midwife Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC). OPSC was designed for ex-combatant Boko Haram that willingly surrender, which was established in September 2015 and become operational in 2016, (Kilete, 2020). While Bukarti and Bryson (2019)

observed that OPSC is open to 'willing, repentant and surrendered Boko Haram fighters' in theory for six months but in operation one year which is carried out in a temporary facility in Gombe state and to build trust and confidence, participants are addressed as clients. Notwithstanding, OPSC comprises four broad stages: documentation and profiling, buy-in, de-radicalization, and re-integration, (ibid.).

The first three stages are carried out at the DRR Camp in Mallam Sidi, Gombe state while the re-integration place is to be chosen by each client, (Omonobi, 2020; Bukarti, 2019). Documentation and profiling, clients' personal information is collected including DNA and biometrics were capture on national data using the National Identity Management Commission facilities for effective follow up after re-integration. At buy-in, the program is introduced to clients and their confidentiality is guaranteed, and that no criminal proceedings will take against them, (Bukarti & Bryson, 2019; Omonobi, 2020)

The De-radicalisation attempt to address the root cause of Boko Haram insurgency (Dasuki, 2014) which in DRR include religious ideology, political grievances, and trauma, (Bukarti & Bryson, 2019). Imams engaged clients after every five daily prayers to counter the radical ideology with Quran verses that forbid violence. Albani (2009) argued that Imams that preach against Boko haram are considered by them as working for the government. This raises the question of to what extent will they trust and listen to those camp's Imams? To address the political grievances such as poverty, unemployment, marginalization, and illiteracy which are some of the root causes of Boko Haram, clients are trained in rudimentary vocational skills training by officials of Nigeria's Na-

tional Directorate of Employment, (Bukarti & Bryson, 2019; Dasuki, 2014).

The National Directorate of Employment provides participants with alternatives ways of seeking their livelihoods after re-integration. Clients are given several options to choose from including carpentry, tailoring, shoemaking, welding, barbing, cosmetology, farming, and leatherwork. They are also taught basic literacy, numeracy, and civil education to equip them to understand better how government works and to teach ways of participating in the political system and channeling grievances to appropriate authorities. While for trauma, they receive psychotherapy, psycho-spiritual counseling, art therapy, social therapy, and drug-use intervention and recreation, (Bukarti and Bryson, 2019; Kilete, 2020).

The soft approach to counter-terrorism which gave birth to OPSC was designed to be implemented as a team program between the three tiers of governments, civil societies, and communities, (Dasuki, 2014). An interviewee from the Gombe state government did not concur with the policy synergy in the implementation of OPSC and further noted that the temporary camp was enforced on the Gombe state government. Bukarti and Bryson (2019) observed that 'state government have indicated little willingness to the programs'. At the re-integration, clients choose where they want to be relocated, and often this is a place where they have family members, their family members are contacted to obtain their consent, after which community and religious leaders are brought in to prepare the community for the clients' reinsertion (ibid).

Speaking during the exercise, Bamidele Shafa, Coordinator, OPSC, said that the appearance of the repentant insurgents before the quasi-judicial panel under the federal

high court Gombe to denounced Boko Haram membership and take an oath of allegiance to be loyal, disciplined, and obedient citizens was a major requirement before reinsertion into the community, parole officers are assigned to monitor the client for at least six months. To this end, as of July 2020, a respondent from the Gombe state government say OPSC had graduated its fourth batch while available data show 101 people in November 2018, 280 in June 2020, and 602 in July 2020, with starter packet and take-off fund, (Bukarti and Bryson, 2019, Kilete, 2020; Omonobi, 2020).

Nigeria's counter-terrorism is faced with many impairments. Shehu and Garba (2020) observed that the security personnel in the North East are not receiving their due allowances and that the government have not responded to the cry on service chiefs who had already outlived their service years. Akpan, Ekanem, and Adeoye (2014:152) described the government's response to the Boko Haram insurgency as 'has been reactionary than proactive.

Respondents had noticed a lack of cooperation and team spirit among the security agencies and with the general populaces in the fight against Boko Haram. In the same vein, Albani (2009) alleged that some Nigerian security personnel have turned their loyalty and service to Boko Haram.

Akpan, Ekanem, and Adeoye (2014) outlined "there are individuals within and outside the government that is benefitting from the insurgency through contracts and supplies to government" such individuals sabotage all efforts to end the insurgency. Also that the federal government is using the same methods (forces, administrative panel, and negotiation) is used in addressing the Niger-Delta military to tackle Boko Haram.

Bukarti and Bryson (2019) observed that "combatants may be forced to surrender by

many factors, such as military pressure or lack of supplies". The puzzle, is it possible to screen individuals adequately to measure their threat level? The chairman of, Senate Committee on the Army, Senator Ali Ndume, question OPSC's timing, and monitoring device, and noted that one of repented de-radicalized Boko Haram killed his father and took away his two cows, (Igwe, 2020). This concurred with Martin's (2008:44) assertion that 'once a man is trained to fight he will do so, there is no rehabilitation, no renouncing of violence, no turn to mainstream politics that can alter his disposition to violence'.

#### Findings:

From the foregoing, it can be deduced that Nigeria is a state at war with itself. The legitimate government should improve its effort in the fight against insurgents and the tasks of the state existence which is a good life for all populaces. It remained difficult to date when the insurgent was formed but Nigeria's authority knew and act first in 2002 in Yobe state. From 2002 to 2009, Boko Haram was spreading its ideology and gathering weapons for the violence that commence in July 2009. Boko Haram is a radical Islamic sect, seeking to establish a caliphate – Sharia law. It enrolled new members by given them believed better alternative and hope than Nigeria's state and by force.

Their membership cut across West Africa with flexible organizational/department structures. Members, like-minded contributions, and robberies are her major sources of funds. Like bush fire, the insurgency has engulfed Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, unless tame it may reach other African states.

Opinions harnessed from scholarly articles and interviews, Ekpo and Mavalla (2017:15) sum up Nigeria's government perception of Boko Haram, "it appears Nigeria's government has adopted a mono-causal pers-

pective on the lenses of viewing the Boko Haram militant as mere bandits who camouflage on the veneer of religion to perpetrate and perpetuate aimless and visionless violence". This concurred with Akpan, Ekanem, and Adeoye (2014) that Nigeria's government is using the same methods used in Niger Delta in tackling Boko Haram. The foregone affirmed the assertion that 'an eye does not see what it did not know'.

The information gathered in the course of the research, positions the solutions put forward by Nigeria's state as more reconciliatory and with an element of criminal justice, in the light of Ami Pedahzur's counter-terrorism models as captured in Simon (2010). The perception or general features are terrorism is a political problem and the goals and methods of the state in the reconciliatory counter-terrorism model are addressing the root cause(s) of terrorism. The strategy rolls out by the national security adviser (Sambo Dasuki) on 18<sup>th</sup> March 2014, is to counter terrorism by its root causes. This was developed into a plan and action in DRR (in Kuje prison and OPSC) and the establishment of the North East Development Commission. While the former is gear to restore the insurgents into mainstream life, the latter to deter prospective insurgents via life enhancement, protection, and security of life and properties.

On the other hand, criminal-justice, counter-terrorism model, perception, or general features see terrorism as a crime and the goals and methods of the state are to arrest and punish terrorists according to the rule of law. Although interviewees expressed their dissatisfaction with court proceedings for suspected Boko Haram but the presence of the quasi-judiciary panel before insertion of OPSC clients into communities and Kuje prison programs indicate an element of the criminal-justice model. While the military

and other security agencies are not or have not been employed/use in the latter and spirit of defensive and war models, general features/perception and goals and methods of the state which are terrorism is a physical and psychological threat and terrorism, is an act of war and protecting potential target and victims and to eliminate terrorism through military force respectively.

#### Recommendations

The following recommendations, when designed in policy, programs, and projects will not only solve Boko Haram insurgency but many challenges of Nigeria's state and other developing democracy and third world countries:

1. Boko Haram should be seen as a well-equipped Islamic insurgent who employed terrorism, abduction, kidnapping, arm robbery, guerrilla warfare, etc. and capable of topping the civil and inclusive system;
2. Defensive and war counter-terrorism should be employed to protect potential targets and eliminate terrorism with military force;
3. Nigeria's state under any administration should be transparent, accountable, and incremental in addition to unbiased responding to the needs of her citizens;
4. Importation and transplanting of policies, programs, and methods should be stopped. Any policy, program, etc. should be defined by the problem itself;
5. All the security agencies should see themselves as a team with team spirit, working for a sole goal;
6. Recruitment into coercive apparatus of the state, just as any other, should

- be meritocratic and federal character principles;
7. Security personnel should be adequately equipped with modern security tools and with civilian-security relationships;
  8. Marriage and birth out of wedlock should be regulated to reduce social vices and improve parenting and accountable life at the individual/personal level;
  9. In addition to democratic norms in political parties' activities, citizens at voting to election result announcement should have the final say on who will lead them; and
  10. Nigeria should note that individual security lies in that of others and no one will be safe if all are not safe. Hence all hands should be on the desk.

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