



Socratic Hubris; a Way to Understanding Socrates Trial and Execution

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Abstract:

There are several debates around why Socrates executed but none of them has explained why he executed at seventy. I think Socratic hubris can explain it. In fact, if we refer to “earlier Socrates” dialogues that cover life of Socrates from youth to seventy years, it is obvious that Socrates on effort to find and present a good life appealed to speech and used it to cross-examine Athenians. However, through it, he acted hubris for many years. Socratic hubris, whether it was apparent and through explicit speech or hidden and through irony, ridicule, and exaggeration, was against Athenian shame culture and against every interlocutors who was examined. In other words, it was against *aidos* and put Socrates as “I” against Athenians as “Others”. Therefore, it could be considered a guilt and be punished, but since Socratic hubris was personal, and then gradual, he could be alive for about three decades and was executed at seventy.

Keywords: Socrates, Hubris, *Aidos*, Trial, Execution, Speech-act.

Introduction

One of the case studies in political philosophy is Socrates. He lived seventy years and because of his trial and execution- became perpetual and controversial. In fact, the trial and execution has raised many debates and several Socratic scholars have argued about it and its “why”. If we want to explore the reason(s) - answer (s) to “why”-, certainly, the most common and clear reasons are found on indictment.

The accusers brought an indictment against Socrates containing two accusations: Corrupting the youth and not believing in the city gods, but in other new spiritual be-

ings.(Laertius, 1972:40) However, Socrates himself added two other accusations that “old plaintiffs” had aroused: investigating the things beneath the earth, and making the weaker argument the stronger. (Apology, 18b)

Beside these reasons, the scholars explain other reasons whether they find in Socrates’ speech in trial- defense- or before the trial. In regard to the former, there are commentaries focus on the style and motives of Socrates’ defense with this general thesis that “Socrates speech was not intended to be a serious response to his accusers. Instead, we are told, Socrates was primarily interested in pro-

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claiming the paramount importance of the philosophical way of life and cared little or nothing about securing his own acquittal.” (Brickhouse & Smith, 1990: 38) The great Hellenist Grote, Burnet, Taylor, and Allen are some who take in above statement. For example, Taylor believes that Socrates’ defense is more like “an avowal of guilt” and Burnt argues that Socrates “uses his time in the court to mock the ignorance of his prosecutors and jurors.” (ibid,38-9)

In the latter (before the trial), there are some points connected to the relationship between Socrates and democracy. Although he did not have any political teachings, Socrates had companions who some of them were anti-democratic- so-called tyrants or oligarchs. e.g. Critias, Nicias, Charmides and Alcibiades. However, the indictment does not suggest that Socrates was prosecuted for his political views and his political associates, these companions in the age of democracy could mean hostility by itself. Vlastos, E. M. Wood and N. Wood, Brickhouse, Smith, and Wallach attempt to explain political aspect of trial. For instance, Vlastos argues that Socrates was perceived in his time as an enemy of Athenian democracy ,and that this provided (but not the) motive for his trial.(Vlastos, 1996: 25-45) Also, E. M. Wood and N. Wood refer to Socrates’ praise of oligarchic states such as Sparta and Crete and his criticism of democracy.(Wood and Wood, 1996:45-69)These theses are supported by one evidence: one of three accusers was Lycon, “a man of Socrates generation who had become a democratic leader after the fall of the oligarchy of 411.” (Nails, 2006: 7)

But, if we pay attention to these reasons, we will find that they are partly convincing. In other words, they can cover just a part of the trial- before, after, or on the trial- not all

of it .When we remember that Socrates was persecuted, condemned and executed at seventy, a basic question emerges: Why Socrates was on the trial at seventy? All the reasons that Socrates, indictment, and some scholar srefer, are old and if they had been acceptable ones, Socrates would have been executed sooner than it. Even if we agree with reasons depended on Socrates’ speech on the trial, again we can’t forget that there were old reasons and thus the basic question sustains: Why Socrates was on the trial at seventy? Or in fact, if the reasons for execution were old and related to many years ago, as old accusers said and some other evidences support, why he did not executed much sooner?

In response, my thesis focuses on Socratic hubris. According to that, Socrates hubris was against Athenian *aidos*, and because his hubris was personal, and then gradual, not like Athenian *aidos* as a culture and public, he lived freely for many years. In fact, Socrates hubris puts him as “I” against Athenians as “Others” during about thirty years.

In order to understand Socratic hubris, I interpret some dialogues that connected to “earlier Socrates” i.e. Apology, Crito, Laches, Lysis, Charmides, Eutyphron, and show how Socrates’ speech acts; but before it, I need to explain two concepts: *aidos* and *hubris*. Therefore, in a conceptual framework, I return to a historical background and describe the process of transforming two concepts by the fifth century B. C., the age of Socrates.

Conceptual framework

Although *hubris* (ὑβρις) and *aidos* (Αἰδώς) usually can be translated as pride and shame, in return to the ancient Greek, we find extended meanings for them. Historically, we see roots of *hubris* and *aidos* in the creation myth. Hesiod in *Theogony* describes how

Prometheus stole fire and wisdom from Olympus for the benefit of humanity- naked and defenseless human- against the will of Zeus, and the eternal punishment which Prometheus would endure for these acts as inflicted upon him by the judgment of Zeus. (Hesiod, 1966:507-616) Here, it is the first time that hubris and *aidos* emerge. In fact, human needed things belonged to gods, and however Prometheus engaged as a mediator and punished, it was the human who used divine property without permission. This act suggests human to enter realm of gods, participate in their skills, outrage sacred ones and violate divine order. In this context, disrespecting gods and sacrilegizing, means refusing *aidos* and exercising hubris, and as Nietzsche says, it brings into being painful contrast between human and gods, the first problem of philosophy". (Nietzsche, 2006: 73)

This contrast between human and gods is completely opposed to archaic Homeric culture in which primitive man does not yet regard himself as the source of own decisions and feels that he is bound to the gods; that development is reserved for tragedy. (Snell, 1982:31) Aeschylus, the father of tragedy, shows that development (hubris) by *The Persians* that refers to Greece- Persian wars. In *The Persians*, Xerxes invites the gods' enmity for his hubristic expedition against Greece in 480/79 BCE; the focus of the drama is the defeat of Xerxes' navy at Salamis but the defeat is not simply due to power of Greece; According to Aeschylus, it had been ordained and postponed until Xerxes' brashness- hubris- did. Xerxes underestimated the will of gods and decided on his own, namely did not acknowledge human boundaries. Consequently, gods angered and Persian defeat as a plight happened. (Aeschylus, 2014:369)

In the *Illiad* we can see also *aidos* and hubris as an important matter between man and man. In ancient thought, there is a sequence

in cosmos or order of universe, which lays gods beyond human, and similarly superiors beyond others. This hierarchy in the work of Homer identifies the heroic or aristocratic ethic. Indeed, the *Illiad* presents a hero as a virtuous man, somebody who is privileged primarily due to ancestry. The Homeric hero is powerful, courageous, affluent and in general, superior. (Colaiaco, 2001: 91) Therefore, everybody respects him. Otherwise, shame, the spirit of reverence, which held man back from rash transgressions, would be stained and a hubristic act appears. Saxonhouse well leads us to this point by focusing on Thersites' hubris. (Saxonhouse, 2006:1-2) Thersites was not a noble but when superiors were deliberating about the siege of Troy, he shamelessly entered and began to say his view. Then, Odysseus shouted at him and beat on his back by his stick. (Homer, 1978: II, 208-234) Odysseus reproached him because he did a hubristic act that was considered as an error (*hamartia*) in Homeric culture. (Colaiaco:94)

It is necessary to note that in Homeric culture which is a great part of shame culture, action and social judgment is the key for evaluate a man. In fact, in a shame culture, praise and blame are sources honor (*time*) and shame (*aidos*), and highest good of Homeric man is enjoyment of *time*, public esteem. According to the Homeric code of honor, one was judged not by the internal standard of intentions, but by results, .To judge a man is to judge his action. (Ibid, 92-4) Then, hubris was considered as an error since related to "action morality" and external judgment.

Establishing democracy, at least from the time of Solon (6th century BCE), hubris was defined as a crime and any citizen could bring charges against another party, as was the case also for treason or impiety. In contrast, only a

member of the victim's family could bring charges for murder. Hence, the cases of hubris was determined and related to the city (polis) and citizenship.

This relationship had been resulted from an economic crisis that a religious- moral order and the rule of law were used to control it. As Colaïaco noted, during the seventh century B.C., Greece was plagued by a severe economic crisis, and as the poor were preyed upon by the rich, Athens was threatened by disruption that could be cured only by the rule of law and a new view virtue. This view came from Delphi: "Nothing to excess". Also Solon drafted a new law code designed to introduce more social equality into a city on the verge of class war.(Ibid,95)

The new view of virtue and the new law code gradually led to dismiss ancient aristocratic and hierarchic order. In democracy some equality, i.e. equality of citizens was governed. As a result, disrespecting for nobles and superiors did not mean hubris anymore. Equal citizens had a sense of collective responsibility and were attentive to the good of the polis. Therefore, shame defined in related to the polis as a whole. In other words, every citizen had to consider gaze of others.

By establishing democracy, although aristocratic hierarchy was dismissed, another hierarchy replaced: hierarchy in the soul. This replacement was a change and transformation for the perception of hubris and *aidos*. As a matter of fact, by the fifth century B. C., there were not any words equating to "soul" as a part for thought and feeling. For Homer, human was defined just as a body (*soma*) and soul (*psyche*) as a vital power which leaved body at death moment. Then, there was not any foundational difference between body and soul. (Dodds, 1973:138) But classical Greek thinkers, Socrates and

Plato, introduced soul as an independent part. "Plato's term *psyche*, usually translated soul, often corresponds closely to the modern term "mind"... He argues that the body and the soul are distinct entities with different natures, material and immaterial. This view is often called "Platonic dualism". (Miller, 2009: 278)

Along with dualism, Plato is initiator of "the tripartite soul" which is hierarchical: rational part (*logistikon*), the spirit (*thumoeides*), and appetite (*epithumetikon*). (Republic, IV) In fact, in the case of a just soul, the rational part is the natural ruler and is obeyed by the spirit and appetite. In this reading, what is important to my purpose is that hubris connects to the soul. One of the Platonic dialogues which is describing the relationship between the soul and hubris is *Phaedrus*. While it discusses about love, *Phaedrus* refers to hubris that is related to desires and opposed to the rational part:

"We must observe that in each one of us there are two ruling and leading principles, which we follow whithersoever they lead; one is the inner desire for pleasures, the other an acquired opinion which strives for the best. These two sometimes agree within us and are sometimes in strife: and sometimes one, and sometimes the other have the greater power. Now when opinion leads through reason toward the best and is more powerful, its power is called *sophrosone*, but when desire irrationally drags us toward pleasures and rules within us, its rule is called *hubris*. (Phaedrus,237d-238a)

As we see, here, hubris as an excess is opposed to *sophrosone* or self-restrained that related to the rational part of the soul; but hubris itself arises from seeking pleasures or appetite, the third part of the soul that is inferior. Plato's assertion on the rational part is

so much that he believes every desire, which prevails over the reason, is hubris. Therefore, he explores hubris in different names and forms, from gluttony to love (*eros*). (Ibid, 238a-c)

Now, hubris is not simply the same notion as *hamartia* or disobedience against gods but it extends to the interior of man. This reading of hubris can lead us to Socratic hubris, the action which refers to the interior, however, not in a weak meaning as above.

Socratic hubris

Perhaps it seems strange that I claim Socratic hubris- as an act which was led to his execution- is relevant to his efforts for good life (*Eudaimonia*)- as an act for happiness of himself and others. This effort has made through speech and many Athenians who “neither their views nor their argumentative powers are uniformly bad” (Warne, 2013:8) were its interlocutors. According to this, I will highlight Socrates speech in relation to the good life. This speech is included two layers which both support the above claim, and of course, the essay’ thesis: surface or external layer, and deep or internal layer. Although both of layers has oriented to the good life, the former deals with good life in general and the later engages in it in details. In the following, they are presented.

Surface or External Layer

In the surface or external layer which is quite clear and apparent, because explicitly points good life up, Apology is the best source in which Socrates’ speech is illustrative to his hubris. Socrates on the trial through the speech shows that he has violated ancient order, namely, he practices hubris by presenting a new way to good life.

As we know, for the first time Socrates paid attention to the soul as a better part in

comparison to the body, and “he seems generally to think that caring for our soul, and for ourselves, has everything to do with getting our beliefs straight.” (Rowe, 2011:204) On the trial, he reminds Athenians that the meaning of virtue has changed by him and happiness is related to care for the soul. He denies validity of happiness introduced by heroic culture and declaims that he makes them happy in real. (Apology, 36e) Socrates insists on it when he says: “I go about doing nothing else than urging you, young and old, not to care for your persons or your property more than for the perfection of your souls, or even so much; and I tell you that virtue does not come from money, but from virtue comes money and all other good things to man, both to the individual and to the state.” (Ibid, 30a-b)

For Socrates Caring the soul is so much important that he advises it as a cure for the body. In the *Charmides*, when he is asked to present a medicine to treat Charmides headache, Socrates present scaring the soul, of course by focusing on virtue of temperance (*sophrosone*). He argues that “should not treat body without soul” and “the treatment of the soul is by means of certain charms, and these charms are words of the right sort: by the use of such words is temperance engendered in our souls, and as soon as it is engendered and present we may easily secure health to the head, and to the rest of the body also.” (Charmides, 156e-157a)

Along with changing the virtue, Socrates transforms *aidos* into a passion of shame of not caring the soul, an interior affair, that everybody from the noble to the many should consider it. While he interrogatively addresses Athenians and finds them blameworthy, Socrates acknowledges this transformation: “not ashamed to care for the acquisition of wealth and for reputation and honor, when you neither care nor take thought for wisdom

and truth and the perfection of your soul?" (Apology, 29e) Indeed, Socrates by this speech not only is transforming the concept of *aidos*, but he again commits hubristic act also. He asks Athenians for the shame that they do not consider until then. Therefore, it is not surprising if they account Socrates' speech, and speech repeatedly had been heard, shameful and they apply for the punishment.

However, there is a very important point about the surface layer. It is true that Socrates' insistence on the soul and transforming virtue, happiness, and *aidos* was somehow devaluating of respectful things for the polis, and thus a hubristic act and punishable, since he did not had any schools or students (Ibid, 33a) and even his friends and companions were more close to the Athenian *aidos*, his hubris was less public and more personal and he could be alive for years and talk about his beliefs; As if, he was an alone person without any subordinates.

This point is more obvious in *Crito*. One day before execution, in prison, his rich friend, Crito, who insists him to escape, meets Socrates but he refuses. The argument of Crito is a clue to understand the reason of refusing. Crito argues that if Socrates died, many persons who did not know him and his own well would think he could have saved Socrates if he had been willing to spend money, but that he would not take the trouble.(44c) It is clear that Crito as a good friend is doing his best to save Socrates but the point is that his argument has not merely included in friendship; Crito concerns about what "many persons" think, a key word that leads us to the opposition or Socratic hubris, and of course, it's being personal.

Although it seems natural to worry about how most people think about somebody or

something and what their judgment is, Socrates in response to the argument says: "But, my dear Crito, why do we care so much for what most people think?" (44d) Indeed, by saying this statement, Socrates shows not only neglect and even an opposition to Athenian norm, but also a gap or distance between himself and Crito or all of Athenians. Such an opposition is a hubristic act, but as we see, Socrates is alone in this action and even his friend, Crito, who has accompanied him to the last moment of his life, is not in agreement with him. This disagreement continues to the end of the dialogue, but even if we relate it to the loss of philosophical mind for Crito to understand Socrates speech about relationship between the soul (*psyche*) and justice (Emlyn- Jones, C.,1999: 8-9)we should not forget that Crito as a close and old friend (Apology,33e) after years, has not accepted basic belief of Socrates, and then, Socrates is alone.

Deep or Internal Layer

In contrast to the surface layer, deep or internal layer is both vast and hidden. It is vast because there are other sources in addition to Apology, Charmides and Crito that we can refer to define Socrates hubris. If we remember that Socrates began to explore good life after hearing message of the god of Delphi by Chaerephon (Apology, 21a) and estimate this event before 430 B.C. (Guthrie, 1969:406), there must be many dialogues between Socrates and his cross-examiners, and then, many sources. Of course, for my purpose, dialogues (the sources) which are connected to "earlier Socrates" i.e. Crito, Laches, Lysis, Charmides, Eutyphron, Apology. (Vlastos, 1996: 136-148) are cases study.

About hidden trait in deep layer, I should say that Socrates speech is not apparent to

illustrate his hubris. In other words, there is a layer in his speech, which indirectly refers to his hubris. Here, Socrates hubris has covered in irony, ridicule, and exaggeration and through making interlocutor's shame or making him, different from others becomes clearer. While Socrates speaks to his interlocutors, he appears their weakness and insufficiency and indirectly, his own sufficiency and differentiation. There are good examples in earlier Socrates dialogues to witness this kind of hubris.

In *Charmides*, a dialogue in which Socrates has just returned from Potidaea battle (432 B. C.), and thus he is under forty and probably in the beginning of the way for searching good life by cross-examining, Socrates in dialogue with Critias not only acts hubris through ironic speech but he "hubristically" points out Critias' shame. Indeed, when Charmides could not afford to define temperance, Socrates replaces Critias by referring to his years and knowledge ironically: "but you, I expected to know, in view of your years and your studies." (162, d) We know, on this dialogue, Charmides is educated and taught by Critias and as none of teachings of his educator about the subject is acceptable, it is an irony to speak of "years and study." Socrates' ironic speech becomes more clear when Critias is not able to afford to define temperance, too.

But Socrates acts hubris again while he points out Critias shame. Socrates although himself does not know any definition for temperance, he uncovers ignorance and weakness of Critias, and since Critias is very proud of his knowledge, unveiling of his ignorance is arisen his shame and is considered hubris:

"Since he usually contrived to distinguish himself, he was too ashamed to bring himself to admit to me before to company that he was

unable to determine the questions with which I challenged him, but made a very distinct reply in order to conceal his difficulty." (169, c)

In *Laches* Socrates explores virtue of courage. Here, in comparison with *Charmides*, Socrates is older because he has just returned from Delium battle (424 B.C.) and is about 46, but his interlocutors (Nikias and Laches) are older than him and both eminent generals. However, the age, fame or position of his interlocutors is not restraints for Socrates to act hubris. It so happens that Socrates through putting stress on these things makes them ashamed.

As an example, after Nikias and Laches failed in defining courage, Socrates not only puts stress on his failing but also refers to his disagreement about courage. He ironically says: "I regard them as able to educate a man; for they would never declare their minds so freely on pursuits that are beneficial or harmful to a youth unless they felt confidence in them I, except that I wondered at their differing from each other." (Laches, 186 d)

Socrates highlights his hubris by distinguishing himself as someone who has not had any teacher in this respect; While his interlocutors despite having teachers, because they are rich, they do not know what courage is: "I have had no teacher in this respect; and yet I have longed for such lessons from my youth up. However, I have not the means to pay fees to the sophists, who were the only persons that professed able to make me a complete man; and to this moment, I remain powerless to discover the art myself. But I should not be surprised if Nikias or Laches has discovered or learnt it: for they have more means at their command to enable from others, and they are also older, and have had time to discover it." (186c)

This ironical speech is not something detached from Socrates effort to pursuit caring

the soul and good life but it is obvious that by means of it, he uncovers weakness of anybody whom interrogates and puts himself against others. Of course, beside of irony is other means by which Socrates unveils latent things and acts hubris; Socratic hubris is hidden in his exaggerations, too. *Lysis* is one of the cases in which we can show it.

In *Lysis* where Socrates, “an old man among youths” (223b), searches nature of friendship, from the very first statements of dialogue makes uncovering. He unveils lovely relationship between Hippothales and Lysis. Although this kind of relation was usual amongst Athenian men, it seems, to fall in love for Hippothales means to depend and to need to other that he does not want to uncover before an old man. Therefore, as Socrates asks him to name his beloved, Hippothales feels shame and blushes. (204b)

Of course, Socrates does not pay attention to his blush and continues to unveil his “losing” the heart: “I know you are not only in love, but also far advanced already in your passion,” (204b) But the main point here is that Socratic hubris underlain in an exaggeration. In fact, Socrates relates his discovery to a divine donation and says; “... there is one gift that I have somehow from heaven, - to be able to recognize quickly a lover or a beloved.” (204c)

We can easily relate such a discovery to a sophistication that old people have; or even we can know this statement as declaring a guess but when old Socrates presents it as a divine gift, as a “one” gift, it seems an exaggeration.

Socrates speaks exaggeratedly again some lines later. While he is interrogating Lysis about relationship between to be happy and to do everything he likes, Socrates pretends that Lysis in conversation with him will ac-

quire a good that is necessary not only for his father, neighbors, and Athenians, but for the Great King [the king of Persia].(209e- 210a) Although he acknowledges to use these exaggerated examples to discover what is the friendly and what is not, and in order to hunt Lysis (218c), as Alan Scott says, Socrates (ostentatiously and arrogantly) charms Lysis by philosophy and exaggerates his capacities; As if his interlocutor achieves his ambitions just by his assistance. (Alan Scott, 2000:141)

Euthyphero which relates to few days before the trial, is another earlier Socrates dialogue that is a case for representing of Socratic hubris. In this dialogue, Socrates is before Euthyphero, a religious young man who thinks he knows what religiousness is, and thus, he is very proud of himself; But Socrates cross-examines him and shows hubris against current perception of religiousness. Here we deal with several signs of hubris: irony, ridicule, and exaggeration.

Above all, irony and ridicule support the hubris. Socrates, from the first, ridicules not only young Meletus who has claimed that he knows who corrupts Athenian youth but young Euthyphero who claims to know religiousness.(2b-3d) He ironically asks Euthyphero to accept him as a pupil and teach his knowledge: “Then the best thing for me, my admirable Euthyphero, is to become your pupil and, before the suit with Meletus comes on, to challenge him and say that I always thought it very important before to know about divine matters and that now, since he says I am doing wrong by acting carelessly and making innovations in matters of religion, I have become your pupil. And “Meletus”, I should say, “if you acknowledge that Euthyphero is wise in such matters, then believe that I also hold correct opinions, and do not bring me to trial; and if you do not

acknowledge that, then bring the suit against him, my teacher, rather than against me, and charge him with corrupting the old, namely, his father and me, which he does by teaching me and by correcting and punishing his father.”(5a-b)

Socrates throughout the cross-examining repeatedly appeals to ridicule and irony, but it is interesting that the very repeating this kind of speech, forms exaggeration. Indeed, while Socrates several times ironically refers to Euthyphero’ knowledge and presents himself as a pupil, exaggerates in his interlocutor’ knowledge and his own ignorance. He by artificial humility not only calls Euthyphero as a teacher but more skillful than Daedalus in making words walk.(15b)But basically Socrates through this artificial humility that is the same exaggeration, acts two works; Firstly, he unveils Euthyphero ignorance and weakness and forces him to think himself about meaning of religiousness instead of repeating gods current stories, and it is just the time for Euthyphero to become desperate “But, Socrates, I do not know how to say what I mean. For whatever statement we advance, somehow or other it moves about and won’t stay where we put it.” (11c)

Secondly, he differentiates himself from Euthyphero, and since this differentiation has covered in irony, suggests a converse situation: Euthyphero is a pupil and Socrates is a teacher; A situation that shows a distance between them. Similarly, Socrates as lone person opposites Euthyphero as representative of Athens in religiousness subject.

Although Socrates on the trial continues this kind of speech, he uncovers his differentiation. In *Apology*, we see, he after hearing verdict of guilty considers himself different and instead of punishment that every guilty person has to suffer, requests the remuneration, i.e. the privilege of being served in Pryt-

aneum. (36d). Also, He who formerly had spoken about his specific power, “something divine and spiritual” (31d), after hearing sentence of dead, presents himself like a superior, as a companion for few other superiors. (41b) finally, he goes to a place better than others place.

Conclusion

In reference to “earlier Socrates” dialogues, it is discernable that Socrates about three decades before the trial had started to call Athenians to a good life which suggests caring soul and its virtues. His speech replaced material virtues like nobility and heroic with spiritual virtues; a speech-act, which was opposed to sham culture and *aidos*; then, it was understood as *hubris*.

Nevertheless, an important point that explains why Socrates was alive many years despite of his *hubris* is to be personal Socratic *hubris*. It means:

- 1) Socrates did not establish a school, party, or any other institutions by or through which spoke and acts against the polis; He was a lone person who started a dialogue with anyone and discussed about good life and virtues, but through speech, he acted *hubris*. In other words, he by irony, ridicule, and exaggeration shamelessly unveiled weakness of his interlocutors that it could arise their anger, hatred, and revenge. Therefore, Socrates through speech, which is apparently fine and light, acted brashly and roughly. In addition, of course, since this act at the first place was just speech, not an action, and addressed a interlocutor, not the whole city, had gradual effects and late reflection.

2) Socratic hubris could not be public and Socrates was alone in his hubris. It means that firstly, his speech, which was in contrast to norms of Athens, could not act like a means to unity. Not only Crito who was an old friend but also youth like Critias, Alkibiades, and Lysis were not united with him to stand against traditional values and virtues. Secondly, Speech of Socrates automatically created distance between him and others. However he had said he just knew that he did not know, when he began to speak and unveiled others weak points, as if he knew much things and was different; specifically when he examined some people like Euthyphro who claimed to know or when he directly referred to his special.

Consequently, Socrates as “I” lived both beside and against of “Others”. His hubris did not show mercy anybody but Athens suffers it for a long time because belonged to a lone person who his speech was not effective in short time.

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