



The Impact of Structure and Agent on Iran's Foreign Policy during the Second Pahlavi Era

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Abstract:

The article seeks to examine the relationship between the agent and the international structure in the foreign policy of the second Pahlavi. This article tries to study, analyze and scrutinize on the effect of structure and agent as two intertwined concepts in the literature of structuralism and constructivism on the strategy of the second Pahlavi foreign policy and seeks to answer the question that How can be explained the effect of structure and agent on Iran's foreign policy during the second Pahlavi era? The hypothesis of the article is that during second Pahlavi the agent has been mostly influenced by the structure of the international system because Mohammad Reza Shah in his foreign policy strategy due to the lack of political legitimacy and lack of popular base tried to seek advantageous relations with one of superpowers in the bipolar international structure. In this article, through a descriptive-analytical method, we analyze the fluctuations and cycles of the second Pahlavi foreign policy strategy according to the relationship between the agent and the structure. The findings of this article indicate that maintaining close relations with the West has been the feature of Mohammad Reza Shah's foreign policy that can be examined in different periods. Extensive relations with the United States in the economic, political, military, and cultural fields have been the manifestations of Second Pahlavi's closeness to one of the power poles in the international structure. Although several periods can be distinguished during second Pahlavi foreign policy, we can say that relations between the structure and the agent have not witnessed some challenges during the Pahlavi era.

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Introduction

This article tries to study, analyze and scrutinize on the mutual effect of structure and agent as two intertwined concepts in the literature of structuralism and constructivism on the foreign policy strategy of the second Pahlavi; It seeks to answer the question of how can be explained the impact of structure and agent on Iran's foreign policy strategy in the second Pahlavi period? According to the theory of constructivism, normative frameworks and social actors are important, so that the system of rules and productive sets are involved in the expression of social systems. On this basis, we must consider the relationship between the foreign policy of the second Pahlavi and the frameworks and internal normative institutions. Alexander Wendt believes that structure is shaped by the common ideas and culture of an anarchic system, and recognizes the notion that structure and representation are mutually reinforcing each other. Accordingly, the hypothesis of the article is that the agent was mostly influenced by the structure of the international system because Mohammad Reza Shah in his foreign policy strategy due to the lack of political legitimacy and lack of popular base tried to seek advantageous relations with the international structure. In this article, through a descriptive-analytical method, we analyze the fluctuations in the second Pahlavi's foreign policy strategy according to the examination of relationship between the agent and the structure.

Literature Review

Although some researchers have worked on the subject matter, some of them have a journalistic approach. However, some other

works scrutinize on the subject from other angles of view.

Elham Rasouli Saniabadi (2016) in her article "A Comparative Study of the Second Pahlavi Period (1979-1963) and the Islamic Republic (1979-1989) Critique of Decision-Making models in Iranian Foreign Policy" reviews Seyed Reza Mousavinia's book, and tries to compare the superiority of the agent over the structure in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic compared to the structure-agent coordination during the Pahlavi period. The article, although interesting thanks to its critical approach, repeats the quotations of Mousavinia, which diminishes its originality. One of the main differences between the present article and Saniabadi's research is the author's selective approach to historical propositions, which leads the work to be ideological rather than scientific.

Ruhollah Eslami Shabjareh (2014) in the article "Patterns of Iran's foreign policy between the two revolutions" believes that the model of Iran's foreign policy between the two revolutions can be summarized in six periods. Accordingly, in the period of Reza Shah, Iran's foreign policy is fluctuating. And although the structure prevailed over the agent in the early days of Reza Shah, he tried from the middle of his rule, to coordinate the agent with the structure. In the second Pahlavi era, at the outset, the structure completely dominated the agent, and after a decade, the agent and structure became gradually closer to each other. The difference between the present article and Eslami Shabjareh's research is that the hypothesis of the present article emphasizes on the strategy of Mohammad Reza Shah based on the structure-

agent; While in Eslami Shabjareh's research, more than mentioning historical and strategic propositions, the author tries to enter the constructivist approach and its articulation. The present article is an attempt to combine the two theories and based on these synthetic approach, new perspectives on Iran's foreign policy strategy in the second era is analyzed.

A combination of Giddens' theory of construction and constructivism

Structural functionalism, or merely functionalism, is a framework for constructing a theory that considers society to be a complex system, whose components work together to promote solidarity and stability. This approach looks at society through macro-level orientation, which is a broad focus on the social structures that shape society as a whole. It believes that society has evolved like a creature. This approach examines both social structure and social functions. It addresses the functionalism of society as a whole in terms of the function of its constituent elements that are: norms, customs, traditions and institutions.

According to Talcott Parsons, "structural functionalism" described a particular stage in the methodological development of the social sciences instead of describing a particular school of thought. The main concern of structural functionalism can be seen as the continuation of Durkheim's task of explaining the apparent stability and internal cohesion that societies need to endure over time. Communities are seen as cohesive, limited, and essentially relational structures that act like living things that adapt themselves subconsciously and quasi-automatically in order to achieve overall social balance. Thus, all social and cultural phenomena are considered functional in the sense of working together, and practically have their own "life". (François, 1981:

pp. 13-71). They are primarily analyzed in terms of this performance. The individual is important in the patterns of social relations and behaviors related to his position, not by himself but in terms of position. Thus, the social structure of a network is interconnected by related roles.

Structural theory is a social theory about the creation and reproduction of social systems without prioritizing structure and agents over each other. In addition, in construction theory, micro and/or macro analysis alone is not sufficient. This theory was proposed by Anthony Giddens, who examines phenomenology, hermeneutics, and social practices at the inseparable intersection of structures and factors. Its proponents have taken and expanded this balanced position (Giddens, 1984: pp. 14-44). Although this theory has been widely criticized, it is still a pillar of contemporary sociological theory.

Giddens's constructive approach is one of the most important integrated sociological theories. In this theory, Giddens tries to provide a more comprehensive theoretical understanding for describing and analyzing social structures as well as the actions of social actors by combining the two levels in theorizing micro and macro levels. Following him, Alexander Wendt created constructivism school of thought. In this section, we try to combine these two theories to create a new synthetic approach.

The importance of normative and fundamental structures

Norms have never been absent in the study of international politics, but the widespread "intellectual turn" in the 1980s and 1990s has returned them as a major theoretical concern. Many theories of norms have focused on how to create social structure, standards of appropriateness, and stability in international poli-

tics (Finnemore, 1998: pp. 117-887). According to many theories in the field of international relations, norms and the dissemination of norms are descriptively constructive; whereby the affairs of a state can be understood and detailed in terms of their impact on the world and how they affect and form.

Normative structures that are not usually taken seriously in theories of international relations should be important in foreign policy analysis. Accordingly, domestic norms are related to the norms of the international system. The foreign policy of the second Pahlavi on one hand has been influenced by the policies of domestic agents and on the other hand at the level of the international system and the regional structure has been influenced by the peaceful or aggressive normative atmosphere prevailing in the international system of that period. In constructivism, the same norms cause the same behaviors to be applied. Thus, with the coordination of the actors who are the agents of the international structure, order replaces anarchy and mutual understanding replaces confrontation.

Identity in the structure-agent relationship

In combining the two theories, instead of emphasizing the ability of States or the distribution of power as a structural feature in the international system, we seek to show the identity of states on the other side. Agents' ideas can influence identity, interests, and politics; and the transition from ability to identity is what governments can do to express their position in the regional structure with the international community, even if governments have basic assets such as self-help, a focus on security and national interests. But if they work together on principles, they can change their understanding of their identity and their relationship with the rest of the world as well as the international system.

In relation to the second side of this identity, it was introduced in a way with the triangle of Iranian-Islamic-Western culture and was able to be harmonized with the structure and also crystallized in foreign policy. Regarding the Islamic Republic, ideological discourse and revolutionary identity are less able to understand the policies of the international structure.

In the meantime, identity is not a presented idea, but a historical fact, the result of people's conscious participation in socially accepted inter-subjective concepts. Identity refers to the historical roots of any nation in the sense that something is evolving. Therefore, by analyzing the foreign policy of the political system in terms of identity, the sources of identity of each society must first be identified. For example, one of the sources of identity of the second Pahlavi was nationalism and reliance on the history of the monarchy. This source of identity can be identified in the foreign policy of the second Pahlavi. Thus, we are witnessing a dynamic trend in foreign policy formation due to the influence of identity on the formation of interests on an ongoing basis. This process of reconstruction helps us to better understand how the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran began, which is often the result of a perception of its internal identity.


Foreign policy and structure-agent

The international structure does not seem to be predetermined. It is, rather, something that arises from the dialectic of structures and actors that act in accordance with their subjective meanings and ultimately create reality in public thought. This fact determines the behavior of the actors. It is objective and of course it is not static and it depends on the behavior of the actors or the agents. The norms in the structure of the mold are the

output of collective participation, and actors who are unwilling to follow these norms will eventually be isolated. Of course, the consensus of other actors will result in the confrontation of the international structure against them.

Normative structures play a role in determining the interests of countries in the inter-

national structure, and on the other hand, the performance of countries also plays a key role in maintaining and changing structures. Institutional norms give meaning to the identity of countries and define patterns of behavior. But at the same time, it is the joint interaction of countries that creates and maintains social structures.



Theoretical model of research

The Second Pahlavi's foreign policy

The continuity of Iran's foreign policy developments towards the world events and the main actors of the international system in contemporary history are important to understand the events of Mohammad Reza Shah's time in a broader and more complex relationship with the international system in the Cold War context and the confrontation of communism with capitalism; And Iran was at the center of these international conflicts. Therefore, events such as the crisis of evacuation of Iran at the end of World War II, the nationalization of the oil industry and the subsequent coup d'état of August 19, 1953 and the uprising of June 5, 1963 and finally the victory of Islamic revolution in 1979 cannot be separated from international politics and foreign policy (Ali Sufi, 2009: p. 1). One of the main principles of the strategies taken during the foreign policy of the second Pahlavi government is the subjective and objective confrontation of the government towards the So-

viet Union. From this perspective, during the years 1941 to 1979, four main trends in the foreign policy of the second Pahlavi can be examined.

Supremacy of structure over agent (1941 to 1951)

In constructivism, domestic policy has a close relationship and linkage with foreign policy. In fact, according to this approach, the foreign policy cannot be achieved if the social structure is not taken into consideration.

One of the important points we see in this period (1941-1951) is that in the very early stages of the Second World War and when Iran was invaded by the Allies, the Tudeh Party sided with Soviet forces. In fact, they justified the Soviet invasion by considering them as Iran's savior against the Nazi forces and providing the necessary assistance for the advancement of the Russians, both abroad and at home, through their propaganda. In fact, they wanted to compensate for the help

of the Russians (Sajjadpour and Nouri Sa-deghi, 2010: p. 165). The occupation of Iran had two consequences for the Allies:

1. Further influence of the Soviet Union through the formation of the Tudeh Party in Iran and the formation of the autonomous democratic Republics of Azerbaijan of Iran as well as an autonomous entity in Mahabad, Kurdistan of Iran.

2. British influence and full intervention in Iranian affairs through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and cooperation with southern tribes of Iran.

According to the constructivists, the foreign policy of a country is not separate from the internal developments of that country, but is a reflection of its domestic policy. Therefore, if the political structure is in conflict with the social structure, a country cannot have strong and significant relations with other countries. From 1941 to 1951, Iran did not have an active foreign policy due to the presence of Russian and British forces. The Mohammad Reza Shah considered this decade a reminder of bitter times and wrote in the book *Mission for My Homeland*; At the time of the occupation of Iran, the affairs of the country were practically in the hands of Britain and Russia and nothing was made of us (Pahlavi, 1970).

Iran sought to alleviate internal turmoil by adopting a policy of neutrality and signing a tripartite treaty with Britain and the Soviet Union. One of the issues that worsened the situation in Iran was the non-withdrawal of Soviet forces from Iran's northern borders. In addition, the Tudeh Party's extensive participation in the government as a supporter of the Soviet Union strengthened Azerbaijan's independence from Soviet intervention in Iran; And increased the Shah's fear of the Soviet Union and the Shah's retaliatory strategies against the Soviets. The rejection of the

Northern Oil Treaty in parliament, Iran's protest to the United Nations over the non-evacuation of Iran by the Russians, the suppression of the Azerbaijani uprising, the illegality of the Tudeh Party was all part of retaliatory measures.

By doing so, the Soviet Union threatened Iran with military force and the severance of political ties. As a result, relations between Iran and the Soviet Union became very strained. For this reason, one of the main reasons for the Shah's pursuit of the entry of a third power, the United States, into Iran and the establishment of a balance among the superpowers can be attributed to the fear of Soviet aggression and influence. In fact, the Shah saw the United States as the third force willing to support them against its northern and southern neighbors.

During this period, the Shah's decision-making power in foreign relations was limited, and other political institutions such as parliament and prime ministers played a prominent role in foreign contracts. Between the years of the rise of Mohammad Reza Shah and the coup of August 19, 1953, various crises arose in terms of the relationship between domestic and foreign policy, which obscured Iran's national interests in foreign policy; The lack of a close link between domestic and foreign policy, in the eyes of constructivists, creates an identity that is a fundamental weakness in foreign policy.

The Shah did not play much of a role in directing foreign policy at this time, because for some reason he did not see enough authority to advance foreign policy in the almost democratic political conditions of the period. But in the end, Iranian diplomacy and, finally, the crisis in Azerbaijan led the Shah to seek an allied country abroad in the face of Soviet threats and internal opposition; And reduce the effects and damage of the

internal legitimacy crisis on its government. The political developments in Iran in relation to the crises in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and the role that the United States played in resolving these crises led the Shah and his officials to this conclusion; That the United States should enter the Iranian political equation as a superior power to counter internal and external threats.

The United States was the third force in Iran's foreign policy during this period, although the discovery of this third force dates back to the early reign of Mohammad Reza Shah; But the point of establishment of American power can be considered in Iran's foreign policy since the fifties. In this period, there is no sign of trying to identify agents. Whatever it is, the identity superiority of the structure over the agent. In fact, the shadow of the Allies can be seen throughout this period of rule. Accordingly, the foreign policy of this period is in accordance with the desire for structure, at which time Britain had a strategic advantage over other Western countries in Iran. Accordingly, the confrontation with the Soviet Union and Germany in the foreign policy of this period is clearly visible; On the other hand, we can see the desire of Mohammad Reza Shah to the third force in the last years of this period. That is why the United States is gradually increasing its power in Iran's domestic and foreign policy at the end of this period.

Agent-Structure Conflict (1951-1953)

The Allied occupation of Iran in 1943 led to famine and starvation in society. During the years of the nationalization of the oil industry and Mossadegh's rise to power as prime minister, the policy of negative balance emerged as the first independent theory in Iranian foreign policy. Negative balance

looks at all the superior foreign powers in the same way. Principles whose most important goal is the relative independence of foreign powers East and West or North and South and the emphasis on territorial integrity and national solidarity. Mossadegh's actions in the framework of this strategy caused a lot of tensions between Iran and foreign powers, and Iran entered into several crises.

Mossadegh was looking for a way out of the crisis with the United States. During this period, Mossadegh sought to persuade the United States to support Iran in the face of fears of the Soviet Union and the threat of communist influence. Indeed, even in Mossadegh's time, despite choosing a negative balance strategy, the government sought strategic alliance with the United States out of fear and relative confrontation with the Soviet Union. Although Mossadegh's threat of Soviet influence failed due to incompatibility with Western and American interests, one of the US arguments for the coup in Iran was to prevent the formation of a communist government in Iran.

During this period, Mossadegh played a greater role in Iranian foreign policy than Mohammad Reza Shah. Accordingly, Mossadegh, as the political agent of Iran and his cabinet, are trying to confront the regional structure, and especially the international structure. At the top of this arrow is the United States. In fact, in this short period, Mossadegh tries to prioritize Iranian identity and interests over the norms of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, which were the three major powers in the international structure at the time, but ultimately fails to do so. What is more, with the coup d'état of August 19, 1953, his attempt to present the norms and national identity to the international environment failed.

Supremacy of structure over agent (1953-1971)

After the coup d'état of August 19, 1953, political pluralism disappeared and was replaced by the Shah's authority. Foreign policy decision-making, in contrast to the pre-coup period, which was largely left to institutions with degrees of national and political legitimacy, was replaced by individual decisions and the monarchy. After the August 19 coup, the Shah personally took over Iran's foreign policy. In the next ten years, from 1953 to 1963, Iranian diplomacy was under the joint supervision of the United States and Britain (Houshang Mahdavi, 2012: p. 219). Nixon's rise to power in the United States paved the way for a shift in foreign policy based on the use of force and power on the international stage in the 1970s. This means that the United States left the bearing heavy costs of playing a leading role to those governments themselves since 1969 under the presidency of Nixon to reduce the heavy and overwhelming responsibility of directly defending the countries under its domination and protection; This issue is presented in the form of Nixon views and theories under the title of Nixon Doctrine (Rezaei and Torabi, 2013: p. 168).

In general, since the early 1970s, due to the increase in Iran's oil revenue and its economy, the relative consolidation of the country's economic infrastructure and relative political stability in Iran has created a situation in which the United States has become increasingly involved in Iran; And played an important role in the economy and politics of society (Hadley, 2012). On the other hand, Iran's regional role became so widespread and complex during this period that not only did the imperial regime seek to provide direct military assistance to other countries; The army also performed its duties and missions

abroad. At this time, a small section of the Marxist guerrilla army had suppressed Dhofar in the Sultanate of Oman on the south coast of the Persian Gulf, rescuing Sultan Qaboos from the danger of falling. The Shah even went beyond the Persian Gulf and became involved in the conflicts of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. In any case, relations between Iran and the United States during the presidencies of Nixon and Ford and the Republican government in general (1969-1976) was the period of deep and extensive political, economic and military relations on one hand in order to implement the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine; and on the other hand was a response to the ambitions of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi; Which was pursued by Mohammad Reza Shah with the presence of Republicans in the presidency of the United States with ease.

In this period, Iran pursues its foreign policy in accordance with the policies of the international structure. Relations with Israel and enmity with the Soviet Union can support this claim. The supremacy of the structure over the agent can be seen in this period, and Iran is in the midst of a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War of the superpowers, which inevitably takes the side of the United States. In fact, with the election of the United States, the foreign policy of the second Pahlavi is moving towards the desire and national interests of the United States in the region and the international structure.

Fluctuation between structure and agent (Mid 1970s)


In the mid-1970s, Iran's foreign policy approach changed from positive nationalism to what could be called relative independence-seeking foreign policy. A change in US foreign relations with the Soviet Union and an

agreement between the two superpowers to de-escalate tensions led to a change in the international system. In the meantime, Iran, as the best ally of the United States in the region and on the other hand at the forefront of the anti-communist and anti-Soviet fronts, had to adhere to US conditions and adhere to US policies.

Although the Shah's regime defined the United States as its third force in foreign policy; But he knew that his strong dependence on the United States would reduce his domestic power and political legitimacy to intellectuals and the intelligentsia. This means that the people's confrontation with the presence of foreigners has deep roots in Iranian political culture; Also, the survival of the memory of the coup d'états of 28 August, alignment with foreigners and the resulting national

shame, was considered a weakness for intellectuals (Boroujerdi, 2017: 52-59). This factor necessitated a review of the Shah's foreign policy. As diplomatic puppet relations put him in conflict with national interests. Rising oil revenues, which led to increased arms purchases, gave the Shah hope that he could pursue more independent policies toward the United States; And thus, reduce some of the public hatred of his government and facilitate its internal implementation. Of course, the beginning of these changes seemed late because with the beginning of the 1970s and the rise in oil prices, the Shah was getting closer to the Islamic Revolution every year.

Based on this, we can express the foreign policy of the second Pahlavi based on the structure-agent based on the following model:



Strategic model of foreign policy interaction with structure in the second Pahlavi period

In this section, we will try to explain the strategy of Iran's foreign policy in a specific period of time, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Mohammad Reza Shah, the Baghdad Pact and the attempt to interact with the structure

At the beginning of World War II in 1939, Germany wanted to use it as its bases in Iran against the Soviet Union. The British and Russians sent a note to the Iranian government demanding the expulsion of the Germans. When Reza Shah was behind this issue, Russian and British forces entered Iran. What is more, Reza Shah had helped German forces in Iran during the World War II, and a clear example of this was Reza Shah's permission to establish Nazi brown houses in Iran, which was considered a spying place for Hitler's commanders. (Bollard, 1983: p. 33).

This occupation created economic and social problems, instability, dissatisfaction and chaos. In 1942, the government called for an American financial mission to restore order in the face of economic turmoil. All Allies sought to influence Iranian policy in their favor. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was established and negotiated the granting of a subsidiary during the war with Iran. After the war, Iran's social and economic problems and social conflicts and foreign interventions intensified (UK-Essays, 2018).

From the 1950s and the next two decades, the Shah was interested in the growth of modernizing Iran's economy and society and empowering the country. In large theatrical projects, highly advanced and expensive weapons and fancy consumer goods, all of this put Iran in a position of long-term dependence on Western countries, especially

the United States. There were many misconceptions or optimistic assumptions of the king. He joined Iran's geopolitical position in the East-West conflict and its most important role as the guardian of the security of the Persian Gulf. He saw Iran as essential not only as a real seat of power in the region but also for the security interests of the United States and NATO.

He thought that Washington and London had no choice but to keep him on the throne. He had little close or direct contact with other Muslim countries (Saudi princes, Jordan and Morocco). The Shah of Iran was the first Muslim leader to recognize the state of Israel. He also maintained close ties with Pakistan. During the 1965 war between Pakistan and India, the Shah provided free fuel to Pakistani aircraft, which landed on Iranian soil, refueled, and then flew.

Tendency to America and adherence to structure

When Eisenhower visited Iran on December 14, 1959, Mohammad Reza told him that Iran was facing two major foreign threats: The Soviet Union from the north and the new pro-Soviet revolutionary government in Iraq from the west. This prompted him to ask for a lot of US military aid, saying that his country was a front-line country in the Cold War that needed maximum military power (Milani, 2011: p. 230).

The Shah's engagement with the United States and the international structure led Iran's strategy toward recognizing Israel. The Shah was the first regional leader to effectively recognize the state of Israel as a state. However, when he interviewed reporter Mike Wallace in 60 Minutes, he criticized American Jews for possibly controlling the American media and finances; But the remarks were intended to reassure Arab critics, and

did not affect bilateral relations between Iran and Israel. In a 1967 note to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara wrote that our sale to Iran had created about 1.4 million jobs in the United States and more than \$ 1 billion in profits for US industry over the past year. In June 1965, after the Americans were reluctant to sell some of the weapons requested by Mohammad Reza, the Shah went to Moscow, where the Soviets agreed to sell \$ 110 million worth of weapons. The Iranian threat following the "Soviet option" caused the Americans to resume selling Iranian weapons (Karsh, 2006). In addition, British, French, and Italian arms companies were willing to sell Iranian weapons; So, it gave Mohammad Reza considerable leverage in his talks with the Americans, who sometimes worried that the Shah would buy more weapons than Iran needed or could buy.

The CENTO Pact is an attempt to harmonize with the structure

After the coup of August 19, 1953, the Shah and his court emerged from the crisis, and US financial aid paved the way for militarization. This trend was chosen due to rising oil prices. After the conclusion of the consortium agreement in 1954 and the overthrow of the coup government, the Iranian economy was used to develop the military organization and purchase weapons. Hussein Ala, the last circle of Qajar men, was chosen for such a day to demonstrate moderate policies and move closer to the United States. In addition to American fears of Soviet influence, the British feared Gamal Abdel Nasser, the common language of the Arabs. To prevent Egyptian influence, Iran had to occupy the top of the military pyramid: The Baghdad Pact (renamed the CENTO Pact after Baghdad's ouster).

Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan were members of the pact, which was carried out under British supervision. Accordingly, one of the Shah's strategies for further interaction with the international structure and, of course, the United States, was to join the CENTO Pact. The Central Pact, originally known as the Baghdad Pact or the Middle East Pact, was a Cold War military alliance. Formed in 1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom, it was dissolved in 1979. Following the model of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), CENTO committed nations to cooperation and mutual protection, as well as non-interference in each other's affairs. (Hadley, 1971: pp. 36-71). Its purpose was to contain the Soviet Socialist Republic by having a line of powerful states along the southwestern borders of the USSR. Similarly, it became known as the "Northern Row" to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding into the Middle East.

Peaceful coexistence with neighbors

Following the end of the Cold War and the beginning of de-escalation and a change in US and Soviet foreign policy, Iran also made changes in its foreign policy and spoke of peaceful coexistence, especially with the Soviet Union. In 1341, Mohammad Reza Shah assured the Soviet Union that he would not allow any foreign power to establish a military base in Iran and threaten the Soviet Union. Thus, one of the causes of Soviet dissatisfaction, which was Iran's membership in the Baghdad Treaty, was eliminated; Following the Shah's visit to the country, a major economic contract was signed between the two countries to build the Isfahan Steel Complex and the Arak Machine-Building Plant and a \$ 110 million military contract. In 1973, major projects such as the expansion of

Arak Machinery, the increase in gas and petrochemical exports, the shared use of border river water, and the sale of \$ 550 million worth of weapons were approved by the parties; And in general, the relations between the two countries were expanding until the Islamic Revolution (Ivanov, 1962: p. 274).

During this period, the Shah established cordial relations with the countries bordering the Persian Gulf and established close diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. Mohammad Reza Shah considered Iran to be the dominant natural power in the Persian Gulf region and did not tolerate any challenge to Iranian hegemony; The claim was supported by a bizarre arms purchase that began in the early 1960s, showing the Shah's ignorance of international developments. Mohammad Reza supported the Yemeni monarchists against the Republican forces in the Yemeni Civil War (1962-1970) and helped the Sultan of Oman suppress the uprising in Dhofar (1971) (Karsh, 2006: p. 198).

Change the strategy of one hundred percent interaction with the structure

In the 1970s, the Shah's foreign policy strategy underwent fundamental changes, and in a way, he demanded a new identity against the structure and the United States. The Shah used US dependence on Middle East oil as leverage at this time. Although Iran did not participate in the 1973 oil embargo, it subsequently increased its production in pursuit of higher prices. In December 1973, just two months after a 70 percent increase in oil prices, he called on OPEC members to raise prices even further, which they agreed to do more than double. Oil prices rose 470 percent over a 12-month period, which also boosted Iran's GDP by 50 percent. Despite President Nixon's personal pleas, the Shah ignored any complaints; He claimed that the United States

was importing more oil than ever before, and said that the industrialized world needed to understand that the days of their extraordinary prosperity and even their extraordinary income and oil-based wealth were over. (Zonis, 1961, p. 73)


The Shah's relative confrontation with the structure almost coincided with his downfall, and a few years later the Islamic Revolution won. During the last years of his regime, the Shah's government became more authoritarian. In fact, the image of the king was everywhere. The beginning of all cinematic performances in public halls presented the Shah in various royal poses with the national anthem. He also actively expanded his influence in all stages of social affairs, to the extent that there were hardly any activities or occupations in which the king or members of his family or his closest friends were not directly or at least symbolically involved.

From 1973 onwards, Mohammad Reza declared his goal and strategy as a "great civilization", a claim that was taken seriously in the West for some time. The vast wealth produced by Iranian oil fostered a sense of nationalism in the imperial court. A New Strategy in Foreign Policy During the period of high oil prices, Iran's economy prospered while the economies of Western countries were trapped in an inflationary recession (recession and inflation) after the oil shocks of 1973-1974; It seemed that the greatness of Mohammad Reza was evident both for himself and for the rest of the world. All these praises increased Mohammad Reza's security, and he changed from a narcissistic man to a megalomaniac, and chose himself as God himself had chosen to transform Iran and create a "great civilization."

This was while pride, lack of social base and internal legitimacy, wrong strategies in foreign policy and lack of coherent manage-

ment, led to the fall of the second Pahlavi government a few years later. One of the reasons for the fall of the Shah is due to the policy of diversification in foreign policy and distance from the West; That is, although Mohammad Reza Shah, in the last years of his rule, tried to diversify politics and bring

the country closer to different governments in the world, including Germany, France and some European countries and even China. But due to the lack of internal legitimacy and lack of popular base, this policy could not be implemented, inevitably, the collapse occurred.



Strategic model of foreign policy interaction with structure in the second Pahlavi period

Conclusion

In general, it can be concluded that since the Mohammad Reza Shah's government did not have the opportunity to rely on social forces and as a result suffered from an internal illegitimacy, this was also reflected in the foreign policy of the second Pahlavi. For this reason, as the Shah sought change for relative independence from US international interests, the regime faced a major challenge in various areas, including the issue of the respect to the human rights.

The crisis of international illegitimacy and incredibility of the state on the world stage gave more courage to the domestic opposition. What hastened the fall of the Shah's government was the combination of the Shah's foreign policy crisis with the deteriorating internal political situation. In the meantime, the relative confrontation between internal and external identity and the social illegitimacy of the Shah is quite reflected in the foreign policy of the country in the second Pahlavi period. At the end of Mohammad Reza Shah's rule, by destroying his social and political bases in religious and intellectual circles, he blocked the way back to the people so that a revolution took place to end the Pahlavi dynasty.

Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi initially tried to interact with the structure. In fact, his strategy was based on maintaining power because in the first decade of his reign he still did not have enough power to define his strategy in domestic and foreign policy. After that the Americans helped the Shah in the coup of August 19, 1953, the Shah became more inclined to the United States, although he also established good relations with other

countries of the world. In the meantime, Mohammad Reza Shah pursued the strategy of agent interaction with the structure until the beginning of the fifties, and by that time he became a member of the CENTO Pact in order to create a positive attitude in Western countries such as Great Britain and of course the United States.

During this period, the Shah also established good relations with the Arab countries of the region in order to strengthen Iran's presence in the international and regional structure. In the meantime, as soon as the Shah started the strategy of relative confrontation and changed the strategy of interaction, the rule of his government became at stake. In fact, one of the most important reasons for the fall of the Shah was his desire for diversification in foreign policy. In the last years of his rule, he tried to diversify his foreign policy and interact more with France, Germany, China and even some Arab countries. But the lack of internal and popular base caused a kind of conflict between the identity of the people, which is emphasized in constructivism, and provided the identity of government's foreign policy, which, of course, caused the fall of the Shah and his government. It is clear that the imbalance between popular base and government's foreign policy that Mohammad Reza Shah had established for years, relying on the power of the West and the United States, was one of the main reasons for the defeat of the second Pahlavi. Accordingly, in spite of diversification policy, due to the lack of internal legitimacy, he could not get out of the circle of structural domination.

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