Electronic Voting Based on Homomorphic Encryption in Elliptic Curve

Subject Areas : Communication Engineering

Sajjad Rezaee Adaryani ¹ , Sayyed Mahdi Sajadieh ²

1 - Faculty of Applied Sciences, Malek-Ashtar University of Technology, Isfahan, Iran
2 - Department of Electrical Engineering, Isfahan (Khorasgan) Branch, Islamic Azad University, Khorasgan, Isfahan, Iran

Received: 2022-05-09 Accepted : 2022-08-31 Published : 2022-11-22

Keywords: homomorphic encryption, Elliptic Curve, blind digital signature elliptic curve, Electronic elections, Eljamal encryption system,

Abstract :

Today, elections play an important role in fulfilling democracy, which should be available in all situations. Electronic voting provides a platform to do this anywhere. In this case, there are many electronic selection plans that have good security but do not have the required efficiency. In this article, an election plan based on the cryptography of the elliptic curve collective group is expressed, which fulfills the characteristics such as entitlement, confidentiality, without receipt, the impossibility of coercion, and due to the use of the elliptic curve group, along with equivalent security, it has good performance. compared to the designs based on number analysis problem and discrete logarithm problem (with 160-bit elliptic curve key, it has security equivalent to 1024-bit RSA key). Although the elections based on hommorphic cryptography and the discrete logarithm problem are included in Hozti's scheme, but the more robust method presented with the necessary changes and also by presenting a blind signature that fits the voting plan, it has been tried that this method is compared to the issues presented.

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