Modeling and Identifying Hierarchy of the Effective Measures of DUVOL Criteria and the period of falling stock prices in Tehran Stock Exchange with Panel Data Approach
Subject Areas :
Journal of Investment Knowledge
Rosam Ranjbar navi
1
,
Mohsen Hamidian
2
,
Ali Baghani
3
1 - Department of Accounting, Kish International Branch, Islamic Azad University, Kish Island, Iran
2 - Associate Professor, Department of Accounting, South Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran
3 - Assistant Professor, Department of Accounting, South Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran
Received: 2019-09-25
Accepted : 2019-10-05
Published : 2021-06-22
Keywords:
Political Connection,
stock prices crash risk,
Business Strategy,
Abstract :
The aim of this study Modeling and Identifying Hierarchy of the Effective Measures of DUVOL on Stock Returns and the period of falling stock prices in Tehran Stock Exchange with Panel Data Approach. For this purpose, the financial statements of 119 companies were collected during the period 1390-1396. Multivariate regression with panel data was used to test the hypotheses. The findings of the study indicate that debt maturity, conservatism, political connection, financial constraint, stock liquidity, business strategy and institutional ownership are the most important factors influencing stock prices crash risk.The aim of this study Modeling and Identifying Hierarchy of the Effective Measures of DUVOL on Stock Returns and the period of falling stock prices in Tehran Stock Exchange with Panel Data Approach. For this purpose, the financial statements of 119 companies were collected during the period 1390-1396. Multivariate regression with panel data was used to test the hypotheses. The findings of the study indicate that debt maturity, conservatism, political connection, financial constraint, stock liquidity, business strategy and institutional ownership are the most important factors influencing stock prices crash risk.
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