Disjunctivism and the Default View for Visual Experience
Subject Areas : PhilosophyKeywords: visual experience, disjunctivism, default view, epistemic modesty, indiscriminability,
Abstract :
Martin argues that disjunctivism is the default view for visual experience. This disjunctivism is based upon the notion of indiscriminability: An event is a visual experience if and only if it is indiscriminable through introspection from a veridical visual experience. The argument concludes that the common kind theories, since they are committed to a substantive epistemic principle, are immodest. Thus disjunctivism, is the default view. A number of criticisms have been raised against the argument. According to the main criticism, the condition of indiscriminability is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for visual experience. I deal with the main criticism and also the others. With critically examining these and also Martin’s responses, I claim that the argument is not valid. One of my main reasons is that Martin’s responses to the main criticism aren’t clear and justified. So, until further illuminations, we cannot accept that the condition for visual experience is indiscriminability. Also I explain that the argument, if valid, only concludes that the common kind theories aren’t the default view, not that disjunctivism is the default view. In order to lead to this conclusion, there are further steps to be taken. According to one step, it should be shown that there is no other default view. I cast doubt on the legitimacy of the step. In addition, I argue that disjunctivism based upon the notion of disjunction is different from disjunctivism based upon the notion of indiscriminability. The different disjunctivism could be an alternative default view.
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