Redefining Knowledge Based on the Findings of Experimental Philosophy

Subject Areas : Epistemological researches

Ali Amanat ¹ , Hadi Samadi ²

1 - PhD student of Philosophy of Science, Faculty of Law, Theology, and Political Science, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.
2 - Assistant Professor, Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch of Tehran

Received: 2025-02-16 Accepted : 2025-07-26 Published : 2025-11-22

Keywords: Gettier Cases, Experimental Philosophy, Traditional Analysis of Knowledge, Reliabilism, Pragmatism,

Abstract :

Since the publication of Gettier cases, the traditional definition of knowledge as "justified true belief" has faced a significant challenge. Although numerous responses have been given to this challenge over time, it became even more complex for experimental philosophers, a new group of philosophers who expanded their activities in the second decade of the present century. The reason for this added complexity was the reliance of traditional philosophers on intuition when confronting Gettier cases, while experimental philosophers regarded intuition as highly questionable.

As a result, experimental epistemology emerged, focusing on the investigation of intuition and the definition of knowledge. Based on the findings of these studies, one could radically claim that, contrary to the prevailing definition, propositional knowledge is merely justified belief, and truth—regardless of how it is defined—is not part of the definition of knowledge. Alternatively, in a more conservative claim, one might argue that ordinary people, when considering the nature of knowledge, tend to support a form of reliabilism.

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