Using Bankruptcy Theory Methods for Fair Allocation of Water Resources in order to Reduce Environmental Conflicts (Case Study: Lake Urmia Basin)

Subject Areas : Article frome a thesis

Negar Tayebzadeh moghadam ¹ , Bahram Malekmohammadi ²

1 - Environmental Planning and Management, University of Tehran/Faculty of Environment
2 - Associate. Prof, University of Tehran/Faculty of Environment

Received: 2018-01-18 Accepted : 2020-05-12 Published : 2020-04-20

Keywords: Urmia Lake, Keywords: Bankruptcy theory, Common resources, Environmental conflicts,

Abstract :

Abstract
In recent years, the increasing growth of population and economic development aroundthe world is leading to rising demand for limited resources, and this issue has caused environmental conflicts in the exploitation of common resources. In such situations of conflict, to achieve fair allocation, numerous mathematical tools associated with different theories can be used. A systematic understanding of the interactions between individuals and groups of beneficiaries in environmental conflicts can help to create strategic and effective solutions in order to manage resources, and better policies can be offered by using these theories. Bankruptcy theory is modern, functional and highly flexible theory. Therefore, in this study, by using different methods of bankruptcy theory including Proportional (PRO), Constrained Equal Lost (CEL), Pinile (Pin), Constrained Equal Awards (CEA), Adjusted Proportional (AP) and Talmud (TAL), allocation of surface water of the Urmia Lake basin among three provinces including East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan and Kordestan, was investigated by considering provided minimal environmental requirements of Urmia Lake, (3100 million cubic meters) and the results of the different methods were compared. Based on the results of this study, the CEA method provides the maximum allocation for the two provinces, Kurdistan is 100 percent and East Azarbaijan is 93 percent and satisfies the two provinces from the three provinces more than other methods. Therefore, based on the Plurality rule, the CEA method in this study was selected as the preferred method.

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