The Introducing of Effective Factors in Absorption of Liabilities

Subject Areas :

Saeed Jabbarzadeh Kangarluei ¹ , Anvar Bayazidi ² , Amjad Rahmanzadeh ³

1 - استادیار دانشگاه ازاد اسلامی واحد ارومیه
2 - کارشناس ارشد حسابداری دانشگاه شیراز
3 - کارشناس ارشد حسابداری دانشگاه ازاد اسلامی واحد تبریز

Received: 2015-05-09 Accepted : 2015-05-09 Published : 2012-05-21

Keywords: Liability Absorption, Percentage of Institutional Ownership, Pooled Regression, and Exchange Companies,

Abstract :

The aim of this research is to introduce of effective factors in financing by liabilities in listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. Time period of the research is 2003-2008 and it’s been ed 360 firm-years as sample. To analyze of research data in pooled status were used multiple regression models with fixed effect in econometric software EViews 6. In this research, Debt structure (financial leverage of total liabilities to total assets) was applied as dependent variables and percentage of institutional ownership as independent variable, and it’s used effective control variables on liabilities structure such as dividend pay out ratio, profitability, business risk, assets structure, liquidity, growth rate (market-to-book ratio) and company size, too. Findings show that there isn’t relation between liability absorption and percentage of institutional ownership; however, with entering control variables to regression model, explanatory power of it increases 27% to 46%. The results too indicate that profitability, business risk, assets structure, liquidity, growth rate and size of firm have been effective factors on liability absorption during research period. It should be mentioned that among research variables, business risk variable has had the highest effect on liability absorption based on its high regression coefficient in comparing to other variables.

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