Expounding and criticizing three main objections against Gettier’s paper

Subject Areas : Epistemological researches

Mahdi Soleimani ¹ (PhD candidate, Imam Khomeini international university)
Ali Fath Taheri ² (Associate professor of philosophy department, Imam Khomeini international university)
Seyyed Masod sayf ³ (Associate professor of philosophy department, Imam Khomeini international university,)

Received: 2016-11-29 Accepted : 2017-08-23 Published : 2017-08-23

Keywords: The Tripartite Definition of Knowledge, Epistemic Justification, Gettier&rsquo, s Counterexamples,

Abstract :

The consequences of Getter’s paper were vast and profound that some epistemologists, in order to get rid of this predicament, decided to cast serious doubts on all contents of his paper. We have selected three main samples, among the objections explaining in detail. These objections are as following: (1) bewilderment in the claim that Gettier’s counterexamples embrace all kind of knowledge, (2) perplexity in historical and epistemological importance of his claim, and (3) hesitating in validity of deductions are used in his counterexamples. In rejecting (1), it will be shown that how we can generalize the idea behind his counterexamples to all kinds of knowledge and reveal the inclusiveness of his claim. We have divided objection (2) into two sections. At first, by assessing Plato’s and Aristotle’s standpoints concerning the nature of knowledge, its origin and features, we have revealed that why Gettier’s claim has a Platonic-Aristotelian origin and finally, should be regarded as a classic view. Then, we showed that why doubting on epistemological importance of Gettier’s claim should not be neglected and how it caused turning from assessing tripartite definition of knowledge to assessing epistemic justification. In rejecting objection (3), we have examined two proposed ways to undermine the validity of Gettier’s inferences and showed why both are untenable.

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