Phenomenal conservatism in epistemic justification

Subject Areas : Epistemological researches

محمدعلی  پودینه ¹ (دانش آموخته دکتری فلسفه دانشگاه تهران)

Received: 2020-11-12 Accepted : 2021-08-23 Published : 2022-02-20

Keywords: Epistemic Justification, phenomenal conservatism, seeming, Huemer,

Abstract :

One of the most important views of epistemic justification in contemporary epistemology is phenomenal conservatism. According to this view on justification, if it seems to one as if a proposition is true, one is prima‌ facie justified in believing in it; Therefore, according to those who believe in this view of justification, if it seems true to me that I got the Covid-19 vaccine today, I have justified to believe in the proposition that “I got the Covid-19 vaccine today.” Believers in view of phenomenal conservatism claim that this view is a complete theory of epistemic justification and also provides correct intuitive results in different types of beliefs. In this article, we will explain, interpret and evaluate this view in epistemic justification. We will first articulate and evaluate different perspectives about the nature of “seeming”, and then present an account of phenomenal conservatism. While interpreting and evaluating problems of this view, we come to the conclusion that this view is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for justification; Hence, we can argue that this view cannot be considered as an acceptable view for the epistemic justification of one’s beliefs.  

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