Reconstruction of the argument from illusion for the theory of mental existence in the light of the arguments for the sense data theory

Subject Areas : Epistemological researches

fatemeh mirrahimi ¹ ( Philosophy, Faculty Divinity Political Science and Law, Science and Research Branch Islamic Azad, Tehran, Iran )
mohammad saeedi mehr ² ( islamic philosophy;humanity sciences; tarbiat modares university;tehran;iran )
Omid Karimzadeh ³ ( Institute for Science and Technology Studies, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran )

Received: 2019-10-24 Accepted : 2020-01-01 Published : 2020-08-22

Keywords: Illusion, Mental existence, sense data,

Abstract :

One of the leading theories of perception in the ontology of the Islamic philosophy is the theory of mental existence. A variety of arguments have been offered for the mental existence which are mainly based on our cognition of non-existents. The sense-data theory seems to have many similarities with the theory of mental existence. The argument from illusion is the best-known and most historically influential argument for the existence of sense-data. This argument turns on an endorsement of the phenomenal principle and relational principle. The present article, after briefly reviewing these two theories and expressing their similarities and differences, first analyzes the argument of sense data which are established on illusion. Then, two new arguments for the theory of mental existence would be offered by using two principles of “presence” and “dependency”. According to the presence principle, the object of knowledge is present (exists) for the subject. But when one is subject to an illusion, the object does not actually exist in the external world and thus, it must exist in the mind. Also the dependency principle implies that the object (as far as it is dependent to subject) actually exists and thus, in the case of illusion, since the object does not exist in the external world, it must enjoy mental existence.

References:

جوادی آملی، عبدالله  .(1375) . رحیق مختوم. ج 1 ب4، قم، اسراء

رازی، فخرالدین .(1404 ق).  شرح الاشارات. ج 1، قم، مکتبه المرعشی  

سهروردی، شهاب الدین .(1375). مجموعه مصنفات شیخ اشراق، ج 2، تهران، موسسه مطالعات و تحقیقات فرهنگی

طباطبایی، محمد حسین .(1350). بدایه الحکمه. قم، موسسه النشر الاسلامی

همو .(1377) . نهایه الحکمه. قم، موسسه النشر الاسلامی 

طوسی، خواجه نصیرالدین .(1375). شرح الاشارات و التنبیهات. ج‏2،  قم، نشر البلاغه

مصطفوی، حسن .(1387 ). شرح اشارات و تنبیهات. نمط سوم،تهران، دانشگاه امام صادق 

مطهری، مرتضی .(1371). مطهری، مجموعه آثار. ج 9، تهران، انتشارات صدرا

ملاصدرا، محمد .(1981 م) . الحکمة المتعالیه فی الاسفار الاربعه. ج 1 و 3، بیروت، دار احیاء التراث

Ayer, A.J .(1963). The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. London, Macmillan

Ayer, A.J .(1967). Has Austin Refuted The Sense-Datum Theory?. Synthese, 17: 117-40

Crain, T .(2011). The Problem Of perception. The Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy

Fish, W. (2010). Philosophy of perception. London, Routledge

Huemer, M. (2001). Skepticism and the veil of perception. Lanham, md. Rowman & littlefield

Huemer, M. (2011). Sense- Data. The Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy

Lemos, N. (2007).  An introduction to the theory of Knowledge. Cambridge

Price, h.h .(1932).  perception. London, Methuen

Robinson, H. ( 1994). perception. London, Routledge

Russell, B. (1912). The problems of philosophy. NewYork, Oxford University, 1997

Smith, A.D. (2002). The Problem Of Perception. Cambridge, Harvard University

Soteriou, M. ( 2016).  Disjunctivism. London, Routledge