Consequences of the policymaker's reaction to speculative attacks in the foreign exchange market: The role of the quality of political institutions

Subject Areas : Financial Economics

Shahram Jafarzadeh Gollo ¹ , Hossein Abbasinejhad ² , Teymour rahmani ³ , Sajjad Barkhordari ⁴

1 - PhD student in Monetary and Financial Economics, University of Tehran,
2 - Professor, Faculty of Economics, University of Tehran
3 - Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics, University of Tehran
4 - Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics, University of Tehran

Received: 2022-10-09 Accepted : 2022-12-09 Published : 2022-12-22

Keywords: Keywords: Exchange Rate, speculative attacks, monetary policy JEL Classification: F31‎‏ , ‏E52‎‏ , ‏E58‎‏ ‏,

Abstract :

Abstract Monetary policymakers can choose between intervention or non-intervention to defend the national currency against speculative attacks in the foreign exchange market. Given the incomplete information of the central bank about the severity of the attack, it is necessary to be aware of the relative consequences of each of the reactions in the unit of economic indicators as a result of each of its possible responses. This study examines these consequences in the unit of changes in GDP and inflation for developing and emerging countries and in the period 1960 to 2018 examines the role of the quality of political institutions between selected countries. The results obtained from the instantaneous reaction functions for GDP and inflation as a result of three possible types of central bank responses including intervention with success, intervention with failure and non-intervention in the foreign exchange market show that in the absence of quality indicators of political institutions Low cost will not face a clear and unequivocal answer. In terms of the quality of political institutions, intervention in the foreign exchange market is preferred in the group of countries with high quality political institutions due to the increasing reputation and credibility of the policies announced by the Independent Central Bank. Findings show that in the group of countries with moderate quality of political institutions, non-intervention of policymakers in the foreign exchange market is associated with increased GDP growth and low inflation and is preferable to intervention in the foreign exchange market. In the group of countries with low quality political institutions, intervention in the foreign exchange market is less risky than non-intervention, and the low-cost response is to defend the national currency.

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