-
حرية الوصول المقاله
1 - Applying Stackelberg Game to Find the Best Price and Delivery Time Policies in Competition between Two Supply Chains
M. Fathian M. Narenji E. Teymoori G. JalaliIn this paper, the competition between two supply chains and their elements is studied. Each chain consisted of a manufacturer and a distributor and the two chains compete in a market with single type of customer sensitive to price and delivery time. Therefore, this is أکثرIn this paper, the competition between two supply chains and their elements is studied. Each chain consisted of a manufacturer and a distributor and the two chains compete in a market with single type of customer sensitive to price and delivery time. Therefore, this is a two-supply chain game and during the competition between two supply chains, elements of each supply chain (manufacturer and/or distributor) may follow either centralized or decentralized strategy; i.e. within each supply chain the elements may choose to cooperate or compete in order to achieve more profit. Combined strategies between two supply chains and their elements are of four types: i. both chains apply centralized policy; ii. The first chain chooses centralized and the second one follows decentralized policy; iii. The first chain applies decentralized and the second one chooses centralized policy; iv. Both chains follow decentralized policy. The competition between two chains was analyzed as a Stackelberg game and without loss of generality supposing that the first chain acts as leader and the second one is the follower. The profit earned by each supply chain is related to the aforementioned combination of strategies chosen by each supply chain. Finally numerical examples are provided to investigate these strategies and to determine the best combined strategy by comparing the profit of chain elements and whole profit of each chain. تفاصيل المقالة -
حرية الوصول المقاله
2 - Calculation of the Efficiency of Two-Stage Network Structures with Additional Inputs to the Second Stage by SBM Approach: A Case Study on Credit Branches of an Iranian State Bank in Guilan Province
Saeed Jahangard Patavani Nasima MahboubiMany studies have been conducted to determine the efficiency of two-stage network structures in the recent years. The two-stage network with additional inputs to the second stage, in which the second stage is independent of the first stage are one of these structures. T أکثرMany studies have been conducted to determine the efficiency of two-stage network structures in the recent years. The two-stage network with additional inputs to the second stage, in which the second stage is independent of the first stage are one of these structures. Thus, there is a need for a model capable of calculating the efficiency of two-stage structures as well as efficiency of each stage which can then provide managers with recommendations to increase the efficiency of the entire system and its sub-processes. In this study, a non-cooperative game adapted from game theory and SBM approach is used to calculate the efficiency of a two-stage network structure to provide a unique analysis of the overall efficiency as the product of efficiency scores of the two stages. SBM approach is a non-radial DEA model capable of providing modification recommendations for inputs and outputs. The model then is implemented on 29 credit branches of an Iranian state bank in Guilan province and the results are analyzed. تفاصيل المقالة -
حرية الوصول المقاله
3 - Determining the interest rate on deposits in the Iranian banking system: cooperative or competitive game between the central bank and followers?
Mehdi Memarpour Ashkan Hafezalkotob Mohammad Khalilzadeh Abbas Saghaei Roya SoltaniThis paper studies the monetary policies of the central bank to determine the inter-est rate on deposits in the interaction with the Iranian banking system in the form of Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium games. The leader of the game is the central bank of the Islamic R أکثرThis paper studies the monetary policies of the central bank to determine the inter-est rate on deposits in the interaction with the Iranian banking system in the form of Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium games. The leader of the game is the central bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while the followers of the game include three banks called A, B, and C. The leader of the game regulates its monetary policies based on the relationship between inflation rate and interest rate on depos-its in the form of three scenarios of "legal deposit ratio", "legal deposit award rate", and "the rate of commissions received" from the followers. The follower players also determine "the interest rate on deposits," based on the scenarios of the leader player. The results of this research (2010-2019) by MINITAB Soft-ware indicated that in the studied year (2019), the strategy of the players of this game has been mostly Nash (more competitive) rather than cooperative. If the players of this game had chosen cooperative strategy (Stackelberg game), they would have achieved greater profit. Also, the optimal tool for the monetary policy of the leader and follower players has been the “increasing the legal reserve re-ward rate". تفاصيل المقالة -
حرية الوصول المقاله
4 - A Game Theoretical Approach to Optimize Policies of Government Under the Cartel of Two Green and Non-green Supply Chains
Amir Hossein Yazdanpanah Ali Akbar Akbari Marzieh MozafariIn this research, firms aim at maximizing two purposes of social welfare (environment) and profitability in the supply chain system. It is assumed that there are two supply chains, a green and an ordinary, each consists of a manufacturer and a supplier; in which the man أکثرIn this research, firms aim at maximizing two purposes of social welfare (environment) and profitability in the supply chain system. It is assumed that there are two supply chains, a green and an ordinary, each consists of a manufacturer and a supplier; in which the manufacturer generates profit through franchises. The green and the ordinary manufacturers form a cartel on the market of a certain product with the goal of increasing their mutual profits and maintaining a certain level of social welfare, while the government, as a leader, intervene financially using tax rates and incentives. We formulate the problem as a Stackelberg game model seeking the equilibrium solutions. A numerical example is presented and a sensitivity analysis is carried out. The results show that the investment’s encouraging tax rate in green technology has no impact on the optimal production of the green and ordinary manufacturers. Therefore, it is not an affective variable on the product market, but it is an important variable for the state utility function. Another highlight is that if tax rates are not equal for green and ordinary goods, then either the green or the ordinary producer will be withdrawn from the market. The most important result of this study is that if the government wants to maximize its utility function when the final product’s market is facing with a cartel and the price collusion between the green and ordinary producer, it should realize the equality between the ordinary and green tax rate and there is no difference between these two parameters of the government's decision. If the government is willing to keep the green producer in the market, the optimal and absolute tax rate of green chain is obtained by assuming zero profit of the green manufacturer. تفاصيل المقالة -
حرية الوصول المقاله
5 - A Novel Model for the Analysis of Interactions Between Governments and Agricultures in a Study of Social Beneficial Externalities Based on the Stackelberg Game: A Case Study on Cotton Production
Mohammad Ali Shafia Sayyede Ashraf Moousavi Loghman Aghdas Badiee Kamran ShahanaghiProduction is a key economic activity with potential long-term social benefits that can be thoroughly realised only if governments comply with their duties towards domestic production. Governments are responsible for the production of sustainable agricultural products v أکثرProduction is a key economic activity with potential long-term social benefits that can be thoroughly realised only if governments comply with their duties towards domestic production. Governments are responsible for the production of sustainable agricultural products via appropriate allocation of subsidies and regulation of price policies that would help take advantage of the potentials underlying agricultural production. In this paper, a model is developed to investigate the interaction between two decision makers in the stackelberg game, government as leader and agriculture as follower, with the ultimate aim of providing benefits to all sectors in the society in the sustainable agriculture paradigm. The proposed model is validated and its efficiency demonstrated via a case study of cotton production as a strategic agricultural production. The model is first solved using a combination of fuzzy mathematical and grey quadratic programming methods to account for the inherent uncertainty in a number of problem parameters. The model is then analyzed against various government-producer interaction scenarios and finally, the analysis results are compared. تفاصيل المقالة -
حرية الوصول المقاله
6 - A Risk-averse Inventory-based Supply Chain Protection Problem with Adapted Stochastic Measures under Intentional Facility Disruptions: Decomposition and Hybrid Algorithms
Sajjad Jalali Mehdi Seifbarghy Seyed Taghi Akhavan NiakiOwing to rising intentional events, supply chain disruptions have been considered by setting up a game between two players, namely, a designer and an interdictor contesting on minimizing and maximizing total cost, respectively. The previous studies have found the equili أکثرOwing to rising intentional events, supply chain disruptions have been considered by setting up a game between two players, namely, a designer and an interdictor contesting on minimizing and maximizing total cost, respectively. The previous studies have found the equilibrium solution by taking transportation, penalty and restoration cost into account. To contribute further, we examine how incorporation of inventory cost influences the players’ strategies. Assuming risk-averse feature of the designer and fully optimizing property of the interdictor with limited budget, the conditional-value-at-risk is employed to be involved in total cost. Using special order sets of type two and duality role, the linearized tri-level problem is solved by column-and-constraint generation and benders decomposition algorithms in terms of small-sized instances. In terms of larger-sized instances, we also contribute to prior studies by hybridizing corresponding algorithms with bio-geography based optimization method. Another non-trivial extension of our work is to define adapted stochastic measures based on the proposed mean-risk tri-level formulation. Borrowing instances from prior papers, the computational results indicate the managerial insights on players’ decisions, the model’s efficiency and performance of the algorithms. تفاصيل المقالة -
حرية الوصول المقاله
7 - Modeling the Decisions on Determining the Interest Rate on Deposits in Iranian Banking System by using Game Theory
Mehdi Memarpour Ashkan Hafezalkotob Mohammad Khalilzadeh Abbas Saghaei Roya SoltaniIn this paper, the optimal interest rate on bank deposits is calculated according to monetary policy in the Iranian banking system. The interest rate on deposits is determined using the game theory and a Stackelberg game approach. The game leader is the Central Bank of أکثرIn this paper, the optimal interest rate on bank deposits is calculated according to monetary policy in the Iranian banking system. The interest rate on deposits is determined using the game theory and a Stackelberg game approach. The game leader is the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while the followers include three banks called A, B, and C. The leader of the game regulates its monetary policies in the form of three scenarios and the variables of "legal deposit award rate", "legal deposit ratio", and "rate of bank commission received" from the followers (the banking system). The follower players also determine the "interest rate on deposits" based on the strategy of the leader player. The overall results of this study indicated that in this Stackelberg game, the optimal scenario of the central bank involves "reducing the rate of commissions received" from the banking system and "increasing the legal deposit award rate" under conditions where the coefficient of the importance of the components of the utility function (social welfare) of this bank and the coefficient for facilities paid by this bank to the government, companies, banks, and governmental institutes are complete ( equalling to one), and that the scenario of changing the percentage (ratio) of the legal deposit is not optimal. Meanwhile, the optimal scenario of the follower players was reducing the interest rate on deposits in 2016. Also, the players of this game will be more profitable than their current situation if they choose Stackelberg's game. تفاصيل المقالة -
حرية الوصول المقاله
8 - Modeling the Effect of Advertising and Subsidy Transfer in a Three-Level Channel Using Game Theory
Peter Ezimadu Joshua Apanapudor Sophia EzimaduMost cooperative advertising works assume that subsidy is usually given directly to the retailer. This work addresses a three-level supply chain setting where advertising subsidy is transferable from the manufacturer to the retailer through the distributor, together wit أکثرMost cooperative advertising works assume that subsidy is usually given directly to the retailer. This work addresses a three-level supply chain setting where advertising subsidy is transferable from the manufacturer to the retailer through the distributor, together with a situation where both the retailer and the distributor directly engage in advertising. The parties in the channel are considered to play an infinite horizon Stackelberg differential game with the manufacturer as the leader, and the distributor and the retailer as the first and the last followers respectively. The work studies the effect of subsidy on the players’ profits in a four-channel setting where both the manufacturer and the distributor do not subsidise advertising; the manufacturer’s provided retail subsidy is not transferred to the retailer; the distributor provides retail subsidy without the manufacturer’s involvement; and the distributor transfers the manufacturer’s provided subsidy to the retailer. It determines the players’ optimal advertising efforts, subsidy policies, and profits for the four channel settings. It also obtains the players’ appropriate subsidy limits. The work shows that the channel profits are best with the distributor’s participation, followed by transfer of subsidy setting, and worst with non-provision of subsidy by both manufacturer and distributor. تفاصيل المقالة -
حرية الوصول المقاله
9 - Pricing in a two-echelon supply chain with different market powers: game theory approaches
Afshin Esmaeilzadeh Ata Allah TaleizadehIn this research, the optimal pricing decisions for two complementary products in a two-echelon supply chain under two scenarios are studied. The proposed supply chain in each echelon includes one retailer and two manufacturers and the same complementary products are pr أکثرIn this research, the optimal pricing decisions for two complementary products in a two-echelon supply chain under two scenarios are studied. The proposed supply chain in each echelon includes one retailer and two manufacturers and the same complementary products are produced. In the first scenario, we assume the unit manufacturing costs of the complementary products in each echelon are the same, while in the second one the different unit manufacturing costs are supposed and lead to demand leakage from the echelon with the higher unit manufacturing cost to the echelon with the lower unit manufacturing cost. Moreover, under the second scenario, the products with lower price are replaced with the higher price products. The purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of different market powers between the manufacturers and the retailer and the demand leakage on the optimal wholesale and retail prices and also on the profit of the chain. The relationships between the manufacturers and the retailer are modeled by the MS-Stackelberg and MS-Bertrand game-theoretic approach where the manufacturers are leaders and the retailers are followers. تفاصيل المقالة -
حرية الوصول المقاله
10 - A mathematical model of the effect of subsidy transfer in cooperative advertising using differential game theory
Peter E. EzimaduThis work deals with subsidy transfer from a manufacturer to a retailer through the distributor in cooperative advertising. While the retailer engages in local advertising, the manufacturer indirectly participates in retail advertising using advertising subsidy which is أکثرThis work deals with subsidy transfer from a manufacturer to a retailer through the distributor in cooperative advertising. While the retailer engages in local advertising, the manufacturer indirectly participates in retail advertising using advertising subsidy which is given to the distributor, who in turn transfers it to the retailer. The manufacturer is the Stackelberg game leader; the distributor is the first follower, while the retailer is the last follower. The work employs differential game in modelling the effect of subsidy on the individual and channel payoffs; and models the awareness share dynamics using Sethi’s sales-advertising model. It obtains Stackelberg equilibriums characterising four-game scenario: no subsidy from neither the manufacturer nor the distributor; withholding of manufacturer’s subsidy by the distributor; provision of subsidy by the distributor in the absence of the manufacturer’s participation; and the participation of both the manufacturer and distributor in retail advertising. It shows that in the absence of subsidy from the manufacturer, the distributor should intervene by providing subsidy to the retailer. However, if this is impossible, he should avoid withholding the subsidy meant for retail advertising. The players’ payoffs as well as the channel payoff are worst with non-participation of both the manufacturer and the distributor, and best with transfer of subsidy. تفاصيل المقالة -
حرية الوصول المقاله
11 - Dilemma in two game structures for a closed-loop supply chain under the influence of government incentives
Subrata Saha Izabela Ewa Nielsen Sani MajumderThe government organizations grant incentives to promote green product consumption, improve green product quality, boost remanufacturing activities, etc. through various policies. The objective of this study is to highlight pros and cons of two incentive policies, namel أکثرThe government organizations grant incentives to promote green product consumption, improve green product quality, boost remanufacturing activities, etc. through various policies. The objective of this study is to highlight pros and cons of two incentive policies, namely (1) incentive on manufacturer’s R&D investment and (2) direct incentive to consumer based on greening level of the product on the optimal pricing and investment decisions in improving used product return and greening level decisions in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). Optimal decisions are derived under manufacturer and retailer-Stackelberg games, and results are compared to explore characteristics of optimal decisions, consumer surplus, and environmental improvement under two marketing strategies of a manufacturer. It is found that the greening level and used product return rate in a CLSC are always higher under retailer-Stackelberg game. If the manufacturer sets a target for greening level, the CLSC members may receive higher profits if consumer receives incentive because of higher consumer surplus. However, environmental improvement may be lower. If the manufacturer sets a product return goal, then CLSC members may compromise with consumer surplus or environmental improvement for receiving higher profits. In the presence of direct incentive to consumers, CLSC members can trade with product at lower greening level for higher profits. Moreover, investment in improving used product return is always less compared to the investment in improving greening level. تفاصيل المقالة -
حرية الوصول المقاله
12 - بررسی تعامل رفتار دولت و بانک مرکزی در یک بازی رهبر-پیرو با وجود صرف ریسک (کاربردی از بازی دیفرانسیلی غیرخطی)The Interaction of the Government and Central Bank Behavior in a Leader-Follower Game despite of the Risk Premium
داود محمودی نیا اطهره زیدآبادیهماهنگی سیاستهای پولی و مالی برای دستیابی به رشد اقتصادی در بستر ثبات قیمتها در نظریه بازی بر اساس تعامل افراد و تصمیمات آنها مورد بررسی قرار میگیرد. در پژوهش حاضر، هماهنگی سیاستهای پولی و مالی در قالب بازیهای دیفرانسیلی غیرخطی با وجود صرف ریسک بررسی و روش حل باز أکثرهماهنگی سیاستهای پولی و مالی برای دستیابی به رشد اقتصادی در بستر ثبات قیمتها در نظریه بازی بر اساس تعامل افراد و تصمیمات آنها مورد بررسی قرار میگیرد. در پژوهش حاضر، هماهنگی سیاستهای پولی و مالی در قالب بازیهای دیفرانسیلی غیرخطی با وجود صرف ریسک بررسی و روش حل بازی در قالب بازی استاکلبرگ و تئوری کنترل بهینه ارزیابی میشود. نتایج نشان میدهد در چارچوب بازی دیفرانسیلی غیرخطی، تعامل مقام پولی و مالی در یک بازی استاکلبرگ و با تعریف دولت به عنوان بازیکن رهبر و بانک مرکزی به عنوان پیرو، پیامدهای مطلوب تر اقتصادیبرای جامعه رقم خواهد خورد، به گونهای که رهبری مالی باعث کاهش بیشتر سطح بدهیهای دولت و کسری بودجه میشود. در این وضعیت سرعت همگرایی بدهیبه سمت مقدار هدفش بالاتر می باشد. کاهش صرف ریسک و نرخ ترجیح زمانی، می تواند شرایط بهتری را برای سیاست گذار پولی و مالی در جهت دستیابی به اهداف فراهم نماید.The Interaction of the Government and Central Bank Behavior in a Leader-Follower Game despite of the Risk PremiumDavood MahmodiniaAthareh ZeidAbadiAbstractCoordination of monetary and fiscal policies is crucial for achieving economic growth in the context of price stability. Therefore, the monetary and fiscal authorities must have the necessary coordination and coordination in implementing their policies in order to achieve better results. On the other hand, the game theory is one of the concepts that has many applications in different sciences and fields. Game theory is of particular importance in economics, since it analyzes the interaction of individuals and their decisions. Thus, in the present study, the coordination of monetary and fiscal policies in the long run and its effect on macroeconomic variables are investigated according to a mathematical model. Accordingly, the interaction of monetary and fiscal policies are taken into consideration in the form of differential games with respect to the risk premium. On the other hand, the method of solving the game by Stackelberg game and the mathematical method is to solve the method of optimal control of Pontryagin's principle. In this regard, the results show that the interaction of monetary and fiscal authorities in the fiscal leadership creates better consequences in the society than the monetary leadership so that the fiscal leadership will decreases the government debts further and brings the debts closer to their desired level. On the other hand, if the policy makers consider the longer-term horizons for applying their policies and lead to the reduced risk premium, reduced target budget deficit and the real interest rates by proper policy-making, they can reduce the level of government debt and thereby the society will be in a better situation. تفاصيل المقالة
سند
Sanad is a platform for managing Azad University publications
الروابط
المراكز ذات الصلة
دعامة
الصفحات الرسمية
حقوق هذا الموقع الإلكتروني مملوكة لنظام SANAD Press Management. © 1442-1445