

The Consequences of Iran's Islamic Revolution on Saudi Shiites socio - political situation

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Abstract: *Iran's Islamic revolution had so many effects on political, social, cultural and economic conditions of Shiites outside of Iran and caused a special formation of Muslims identity beliefs in the world, especially shia Muslims. Islamic revolution was a turning point in the Saudi Shia movement to get their spoiled rights by governance structure in Saudi Arabia and helped Shia movements to revive and increase their influence in political and social arenas and led to dynamic Shiite Islamic movements and relatively political open space which had been restricted by Saudi Arabia's rulers. The present study wants to answer to this question that; what are the effects of Iran's Islamic Revolution on Saudi Shiite socio- political situation? Islamic Revolution as a phenomenon in the Middle East which was based on religious beliefs and democracy became a new management paradigm on the concept of resistance inside the notions of Shia and partially removed Saudi Shiite restrictions. At the conclusion of this paper we can see that, Islamic Revolution as a unique phenomenon had so many effects on the socio- political conditions of Shia in the region and also had special effects on campaign organizations in line with restoration of political and social identity of Shia communities in Saudi Arabian.*

Key words: *Islamic Revolution, Shia, Saudi Arabia, Socio - Political Situation*

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Introduction

After Islamic revolutions of Iran, the Middle East has led to important happenings in the region that has overwhelmingly changed the structure of power in the region. After revolution, Conflicting interests between the Wahhabists in Saudi Arabia and the Shias in Iran resulted in a continued competition between two countries as they wanted to guarantee their own benefits in the region and also had special effects on Shia minorities inside the Saudi Arabia.

The Iranian revolution of 1979 was a political revolution designed to overthrow the corrupt regime of Reza Shah, but more importantly it was an insurrection that revolutionized the previously held notion of a revolution. The Iranian Revolution, like many prior revolutionary events, developed as a response to the aforementioned crises, but “the fact that the Iranian Revolution legitimized itself with a religious ideology surprised many Western observer (Halm 1997: 138). The Iranian Revolution is complex in that it is comprised of religious, political, economic and social aspects. The success of a revolution is contingent upon the ability of its leader to capitalize upon the emotions of the citizenry and utilize that impetus to legitimize their rule. A charismatic leader’s legitimacy to rule originates from several sources, but the most effective means for claiming legitimacy is via religious ideological justification, because the Religion is an effective means for mobilizing the masses (Brandis 2009: 4).

The Iranian Revolution was linked to religion, which is a cultural institution, a complex of symbols, articles of faith, and practices adhered to by a group of believers that are related to, and commonly invoke the aid of, superhuman powers and provide answers to questions of ultimate meaning (Lewy 1974: 4). The ideological vacuum of pre-revolutionary Iran left a certain air of susceptibility in the religious- political mindset of the Iranian people. Shi’ism has a long history of struggling against oppression, persecution, and political corruption, three of the most prominent ills plaguing prerevolutionary Iran. This Shi’a ideology was not a novel creation by the mastermind of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, but rather a unique synthesis of previously developed ideologies that were cleverly manipulated to instill the masses with a religiously based revolutionary zeal. (Brandis 2009: 26-27).

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran was designed, according to those responsible for its conception, to uphold, “...Islamic principles and precepts that reflect the aspirations of the Islamic community, the dignity of the human being and the noble values of humanity, together with responsibility before God. These provide for the establishment of justice, political, economic, social and cultural independence, and national integrity” (Martin 2000: 159).

With studding about the shia, one of the explanations to describe and catagirize it is that , Shi’ism is categorized into two distinct entities, Alavi Shi’ism or the Shi’ism during the time of Ali, and Safavid Shi’ism, which was transformed in 1501 into an official state political ideology. Referring to the era prior to the Safavid Dynasty, the greatest merit of Shi’ism up till then was their opposition to all dynasties that established tyrannical regimes in the name of Islam (Halm 1997: 135). The leader of the Islamic Revolution with focusing on these opposite ideas about tyrannical regimes, reinterpreted the Shia political thought and proposed a novel Islamic theory of state: The Guardianship of the Jurist. Ayatollah Khomeini argued that Islamic law outlines an Islamic state in which the clergy supervise the execution of Islamic laws. He explicitly declared that the institution of monarchy was inconsistent with Islam and emphasized the necessity of establishing an Islamic state as a religious duty (Shadmehr 2010: 1).

Beginning with an overview and analysis of the historical relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran after Islamic revolution through the present day, this paper with addressing the aspects of the 1979 Iranian Revolution wants to answer to this question that The present study wants to answer to this question that; what are the effects of Iran's Islamic Revolution on Saudi Shiite socio- political situation? To answer to this question in this paper, we will highlight and discuss the consequences of Iran's Islamic Revolution on Saudi Shiite socio- political situation. In the context of this analysis, the paper describes the main factors that have had the most influence on the relationship between two countries. These factors include ideological differences between the Wahhabists and the Shias, historical fear of Saudi Arabia about the power of Iran and the Rivalry in the region. At the end of this paper we can see that because of the bad effects of Islamic revolution on political relations of two countries, it had especial negative effects on Saudi Shiite socio- political situation.

Constructivism and the Shia Identity in Saudi Arabia

Constructivism is a metatheoretical model in social science and an in-depth analysis of issues of ontology and epistemology that its followers can be located in the middle of the two main parts, i.e., realism and liberalism in terms of metatheoretical model concepts in the mid-range of naturalists/positivists on the one hand and poststructuralists on the other hand and in the substantive issues of International Relations (Moshirzadeh, 2011: 323).

Constructivists for analyzing foreign policy of the countries and investigating the materialization of their interests in the international system, instead of focusing on the goals the governments are pursuing in the international system, try to investigate the definition that each state offers about its identity to specify the goals and interests they are following in the international system (Kubalkova, 2001: 115). Because in Constructivists' idea "identity" is a set of beliefs about "self", "others" and the interactions between them (Fearon & Wendt, 2005: 64) and is strongly influenced by culture and plays a decisive role in determining the interests of a country, Pouliot knows, Constructivism possessing a certain way of reasoning that is based on the meta-theoretical commitments and assumptions like the possibility of recognition despite its construction, the coincided importance of material and immaterial realities and the emphasis on the construction of social reality and the existence of interactive formative relationship between knowledge and social reality (Pouliot, 2007: 361). It should be noted that Constructivism theorists are divided into several types based on the level of analysis, methods and strategies. Ted Hopf, divides the non-essential current or critical views of International Relations at the two categories of extreme Constructivists and conventional Constructivists (Hopf, 1998: 171). While, conventional Constructivists are divided to three categories of "systemic", "unit level" and "holistic" in terms of analysis level. Alexander Wendt as the most important systemic Constructivist, knows this level of analysis enjoying a social nature and believes that mental vision structure of the international system is based on a common understanding that have a fundamental role in shaping the identity and subsequently delineating the interests of states (Wendt, 1999: 385). Peter Katzeneshtein emphasizes on the internal factors of developing the identity of the government (Smith, 2001: 235). He believes that culture, shaping and arranging are crucial in the definition of "self", "other", interests, and orientations and behavior of foreign policy of a state in the international area (Katzeneshtein, 1998: 28).

One way of understanding the 'newly-found' sectarian differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia is, along Constructivist lines, that they are based first and foremost on conflicting social group identities. These kinds of explanations emphasize the transnational character of the Shia as a community. They stress the importance of the oppressive historical relationship between the Sunnis and the Shias in the formation of this identity, but also highlight that it is more political, social and economic by nature than religious.

In other words, they hold that the age-old tension between the sects has primarily more to do with political power than with questions of dogma (Luomi 2008: 17). However, what is important is that the Shias' feeling of being oppressed and the stress on martyrdom and victimhood derives not from the historical experience alone but from more recent experiences as well. Although modern-day Shia identity has been extensively shaped in the modern period, it draws heavily on the past. Oppression is one of the central concepts in Shiism and the 'supplanting' of 'Ali in the selection of the first Caliph and the martyrdom of his son Husain are still fundamental in the Shias' attitudes towards the Sunnis (Luomi 2008: 17). For their part, Sunni rulers have regarded the Shia as a lower caste, an underclass, or as misguided Muslims throughout history, while hardliners such as Salafi clerics condemn Shiism as heresy (Luomi 2008: 17). Nicknames such as 'Persians' and 'Safavids' are used even nowadays by Sunni Arabs for (Arab) Shias.

When we want to analyze the Identity elements of Islamic Revolution victory, It is true that the Islamic Revolution of Iran, like many prior revolutions, was a popularly supported response to a corrupt regime, but unlike many prior revolutions, the main ideology fueling the revolution was that of a religion. Shi'a Islam is characterized as being removed from the political arena, but in the buildup to the revolution and the organization of the newly formed "Islamic Government," Shi'a Islam was the predominant ideology. Shi'a Islam was the predominate ideology behind the 1979 Iranian Revolution, an ideology that articulated the oppression felt by Iranian society and provided an impetus for

collective action against the state. Shi'ism offered a rallying point for all discontent Iranians to unify against the Shah, but more importantly Shi'ism symbolized the struggle between the oppressed and the oppressor, it symbolized the triumph over tyranny and despotism. One would be remiss to attempt to completely define the 1979 Iranian Revolution as either a political revolution or a religious revolution, rather it has become increasingly clear that it was a novel combination of religiously charged ideological discourse that capitalized upon the socio-economic problems of the time. The socioeconomic and religious aspects of the 1979 Iranian Revolution were not mutually exclusive but rather relied upon one another and complimented one another to create the uniquely successful revolutionary discourse of the 1979 Iranian Revolution (Brandis 2009: 46-47).

Islamic Revolution and Saudi Arabia's response

In Saudi Arabia's response to Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979, when the Saudi regime as a matter of its policy began to counter Iran's revolution by financing anti-Shia Islamists across the Muslim world. That policy has born fruition with Islamists in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere taking up arms in the name of an Islam that is diametrically opposed to Shi'ism, the minority sect in Islam. The Saudi dynasty established modern Saudi Arabia and was always anti-Shia in its worldview, which is apparent in Ibn Saud's famous quote to his British confidant, John Philby: "I should have no objection in taking to wife a Christian or a Jewish woman...The Jews and Christians are both people of the book; but I would not marry a Shi'a... [Who] have been guilty of backsliding and shirk [polytheism]..." (Nakash 2006: 44) Such prejudice was echoed in the 90s by Abdul Aziz ibn Baz, the chief state cleric in Saudi Arabia, when he issued a "ruling against the Shi'is, reaffirming that they were infidels and prohibiting Muslims from dealings with them" (Nakash 2006: 50). Predictably, this special approach had direct consequences for the Saudi Shia minority that predominate in eastern provinces. In foreign policy, the Saudi regime had strategic relations with pre-revolutionary Iran, the Shia powerhouse. Iran, which is one of the most populous countries in the region, is a Shia majority country in the region. Saudi Arabia which is Sunni majority country and base of Islam's holiest sites in Mecca and Medina, is located across from Iran on the other side of the Persian Gulf, and before the Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979 had very close strategic relations with Iran. But when we study about the relations of two countries after the Iranian Revolution, we can see that both countries have had ideological challenges and many political tensions that directly affected Shia socio-economic situations inside the Saudi Arabia.

In studding about the Saudi Response to Islamic Revolution, It is important to pay attention to this note that, official voices of Saudi Arabia emphasize that it is Iran's policy and regional activities that is the cause of their concern, not Shiism inside the Saudu Arabia, King Abdullah in 2003 held a series of well-publicized and high-level National Dialogues in line with recognizing and bridging the gap with the internal "other", dialogue among Salafis, Sufis, Shi'as and other minorities in Saudi Arabia. For a state that has traditionally eschewed any acknowledgement of internal religious plurality, this was a remarkable development (wehrey [et al] 2009: 27).

However, as conditions changed and following negotiations in 2003 and government's call on prominent Shia opposition figures to play their role, the group's aggressive policy was replaced with a civil and reformist one and later on, they even redefined their identity and approaches, introducing themselves as patriotic groups loyal to the ruling regime. Of course, this process did not last long and changed abruptly following the fall of former Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, and subsequent empowerment of Shias in the region and gained more momentum and was completed after King Salman ascended to the Saudi throne. The execution of prominent Saudi Shia cleric, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, which was actually a result of Riyadh's regional confrontation with Tehran, undermined King Abdullah's achievements almost overnight and increased pessimism among Shias toward the ruling establishment. As a result, Saudi Shias once again and like the early years of the 1970s, opted for confrontational approaches varying from silent protests to active encounter with the government. However, the new Saudi king has been lucky as Shia groups have been lacking solidarity and internal coherence as a result of which their protests have not gone beyond insignificant moves aimed at restoring their citizenship rights (Kebriaeezadeh 2006).

Without a doubt, the luck of the Saudi king is sure to wear off sooner or later. As a result, although all Saudi courts use such accusations as fighting against the government, inciting tribal conflicts, and not obeying the king's orders to suppress the country's Shias, continuation of pressures will finally


cause various Shia groups to give up their differences in favor of achieving the greater goal. The political capacity and potential that is embedded in Shia ideology, big population, rich economic resources in the region they live, as well as geopolitical conditions in the region, geographical propinquity to other Shia groups in the region, security weaknesses of the ruling establishment and wide gaps within the royal family are among major factors, which can energize secessionist moves taken by Shias in Saudi Arabia (Kebriaeezadeh 2006).

In the meantime, Riyadh's follow-up of policies that spread terrorism in the region and its high investment in increasing Saudi Arabia's regional influence have caused the Saudi regime to ignore opposition and underground currents in the country as a result of which conditions are now ripe to put an end to centuries of political passivity of Shias in this country.

The process of anti-Shi'a policy in Saudi Arabia

The 1979 Iranian Revolution was key to empowering the Shia community. Iran sponsored and encouraged Shia uprisings in Saudi Arabia and when we see the Shia and Sunni Distribution in Saudi Arabia we can reach to this fact that eastern oil rich provinces in Saudi Arabia are Shia provinces. Geographically, there is a large concentration of Shi'as in the Eastern Province (**Figure 1**), particularly in the oases of al-Ahsa and Qatif (Matthiesen 2013: 3). This region is of particular strategic importance because of the discovery of oil there in the 1930s and the subsequent concentration of the Kingdom's main oil interests in that region (Matthiesen 2013: 3).

Figure 1: Shia and Sunni Distribution in Saudi Arabia




Saudi Arabia is 85–90% Sunni and 10–15% Shia. The minority is mostly concentrated in the oil-rich Eastern Province and near the border with Yemen. Gulf/2000 Project, Columbia University

Source: Gulf/2000 Project, Columbia University. Avail able to: <http://www.newsweek.com/meet-saudi-prince-counter-terrorism-379080>

Shiites are a minority in Saudi Arabia, probably constituting about 5 percent of the total population (**Figure 2**), their number being estimated from a low of 200,000 to as many as 400,000. Shia are concentrated primarily in the Eastern Province, where they constituted perhaps 33 percent of the population, being concentrated in the oases of Qatif and Al Ahsa. Saudi Shia belongs to the sect of the Twelvers², the same sect to which the Shia of Iran and Bahrain belong (o.nwankwo 1992: 133-135).

² - The Twelvers believe that the leadership of the Muslim community rightfully belongs to the descendants of Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet, through Ali's son Husayn. There were twelve such rightful rulers, known as Imams, the last of whom, according to the Twelvers, did not die but went into hiding in the ninth century, to return in the fullness of time as the messiah (mahdi) to create the just and perfect Muslim society

Figure 2: Shia and sunni population in the region



Source: Pew forum, CIA Fact book, Middle East 1992, criminology and criminal Justice system of the world, library of congress.

From a theological perspective, relations between the Shia and the Wahhabi Sunnis are inherently strained because the Wahhabis consider the rituals of the Shia to be the epitome of shirk³, especially the Ashura mourning celebrations, the passion play reenacting Imam Husayn's Martyrdom at Karbala, and popular votive rituals carried out at shrines and graves. In the late 1920s, the Wahhabis were particularly hostile to the Shia and demanded that Abd al Aziz forcibly convert them. In response, Abd al Aziz sent Wahhabi missionaries to the Eastern Province, but he did not carry through with attempts at forced conversion. (O.nwankwo 1992: 133-135).

There is a long history of persecution of Shi'a Muslims in Saudi Arabia. During the unification of what now forms the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Eastern Province was brought into the state by military conquest at the beginning of the 20th Century. In this period, the Shi'as of the region experienced intense violence at the hands of Al-Saud's army (Majidiyar 2013). In order to ease discord in the state, a general amnesty was declared in 1933 by King Fahd with the Shi'a opposition. Pledges to improve the socio-political status of Shi'a citizens were made in return for the cessation of anti-government activism from Shi'a opposition groups (Majidiyar 2013). In a similar vein, 2003 saw King Abdullah introduce a 'National Dialogue', in which Saudi Shi'a leaders were invited to take part in an attempt to once again ease tensions (Matthiesen 2013: 73). However, each of these initiatives failed to produce any tangible changes to the social, political or economic status of the disadvantaged Shi'a minority.

In the newly formed Saudi state, Shiites came to occupy the lowest rung of the socio- economic ladder. They were excluded from the upper levels of the civil bureaucracy and rarely recruited by the military or the police; none was recruited by the National Guard. The discovery of oil brought them employment, if not much of a share in the contracting and subcontracting wealth that the petroleum industry generated. Shia has formed the bulk of the skilled and semiskilled workers employed by Saudi Aramco. Members of the older generation of Shia were sufficiently content with their lot as Aramco

³ - polytheism

employees not to participate in the labor disturbances of the 1950s and 1960s (CIA Word Fact Book 1992).

In 1979 Shia opposition to the royal family was encouraged by the example of Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini's revolutionary ideology from Iran and by the Sunni Islamist⁴ groups' attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca in November. During the months that followed, conservative ulama and Ikhwan groups in the Eastern Province, as well as Shia, began to make their criticisms of government heard. On November 28, 1979, as the Mecca incident continued, the Shia of Qatif and two other towns in the Eastern Province tried to observe Ashura publicly. When the National Guard intervened, rioting ensued, resulting in a number of deaths. Two months later, another riot in Al Qatif by Shia was quelled by the National Guard, but more deaths occurred. Among the criticisms expressed by Shia were the close ties of the Al Saud with and their dependency on the West, corruption, and deviance from the sharia. The criticisms were similar to those levied by Juhaiman al Utaiba in his pamphlets circulated the year before his seizure of the Grand Mosque. Some Shia were specifically concerned with the economic disparities between Sunnis and Shia, particularly since their population is concentrated in the Eastern Province, which is the source of the oil wealth controlled by the Sunni Al Saud of Najd. During the riots that occurred in the Eastern Province in 1979, demands were raised to halt oil supplies and to redistribute the oil wealth so that the Shia would receive a more equitable share (O.nwankwo 1992: 133-135).

After order was restored, there was a massive influx of government assistance to the region. Included were many large projects to upgrade the region's infrastructure. In the late 1970s, the Al Jubayl project, slated to become one of the region's largest employers, was headed by a Shia. In 1992, however, there were reports of repression of Shia political activity in the kingdom. An Amnesty International report published in 1990 stated that more than 700 political prisoners had been detained without charge or trial since 1983, and that most of the prisoners were Shia. The relationship between Saudi Sunni and Shia has always been characterized by conflict. Shia Muslims in Saudi Arabia are a minority group that account for 10 to 15 percent of the population in a mainly Sunni country. The Shia communities in Saudi Arabia are mostly concentrated in the Eastern Province, where the population is estimated at 33 per cent (O.nwankwo 1992: 133-135).

Since the 1980s, the nature of the conflict changed from military confrontation to the Saudi Shia's movement for equal rights and affirmation of their culture. (Al Rasheed 1998). Saudi Shias are working establish their community in a Sunni society that punishes their religious expression, limits their political participation and civil liberties, and deprives them of economically prosperity (Al Rasheed 1998).

Shi'a dissatisfaction with their treatment within the state was brought to a head in 2011 when, inspired by the Arab Spring and events in Egypt, protests broke out in the Eastern Province. Protestors called for an end to anti-Shi'a discrimination and fairer political representation, as well as declaring their solidarity with protests in Shi'a-majority Bahrain. The response of the Saudi regime has been categorized by many human rights observers - such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch - as heavy-handed and repressive, with accusations of various human rights abuses levelled at the government. To date, it is believed that twenty protestors have been killed (BBC News 2014) and hundreds of people have been held without charge (Amnesty International 2013).

Yet Saudi reformists and Shi'a clerics suggested that the National Dialogue sessions had no effect on the Salafi establishment; one reformer termed the meetings "hollow debating societies." By the end of 2006, the regime was doing little to rescind or counter the anti-Shi'a fatawa that were being issued by popular Salafi clerics. The shrillest and most damaging of these occurred at the height of Saudi uncertainty about a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and fears of Iran potentially filling the power vacuum. In the official Saudi press, there was widespread speculation about a secret deal between the United States and Iran, and Prince Turki alFaysal publicly warned the United States not to withdraw. In October 2006, Saudi officials met with Harith al-Dhari, leader of the Association of Muslim Scholars, potentially signaling their drift toward a more activist role (Shihri 2006). On December 10, 38 Saudi clerics joined Iraqi clerics in signing a statement denouncing the killing and displacement of Iraqi Sunnis at the hands of Shi'as and said, "we should openly side with our Sunni brothers in Iraq and lend them all appropriate forms of support." The signatories included noted Sahwa shaykhs Safar bin

⁴ - sometimes seen as fundamentalist

Abdal-Rahman al-Hawali and Nasr al-Umar. Other clerics soon followed suit. All of this occurred in a more generalized climate of anti-Iranian seething that followed the execution of Saddam Hussein, which, because of its occurrence on the last night of Ramadan and the taunting of the ex-president by prison guards allied with Muqtada al-Sadr, was characterized in many Arab press outlets as having been orchestrated by Iran with U.S. connivance (Gause and Gregory 2007).

In the first half of 2016, four Shia worshippers have been killed suicide bomb and gun attacks in eastern Saudi Arabia. Attacks the Imam Rida mosque wounded 18 people. Saudi Arabia has already executed 47 people, including Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr.

Al-Nimr was the main figure of the opposition movement in the Saudi Eastern Province and allied himself with Iran. In 2011, inspired by the Arab Spring uprisings, Al-Nimr encouraged Shia protest in Saudi Arabia and demanded equal rights for Shia communities. Saudi security forces retaliated by shooting and killing over 25 young Shia protesters. His execution led to protests in Tehran, and harsher diplomatic tensions between the two countries after the Saudi Embassy was set on fire in Iran. Shia communities are the first targets of attacks across the Middle East, and dozens are killed every month in Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia has created a dangerous situation for Shia Muslim within its territory. But ISIL's recent attacks on Shia mosques are new territory for Saudi Arabia: whither the security measures protect Shia communities within the Saudi territory against foreign attacks? Amnesty International calls upon Saudi Arabia for the protection of their Shia minority: "the Saudi Arabian authorities must take immediate steps to protect the country's Shia Muslim minority from sectarian violence and put an end to decades of systematic discrimination" (Constantin 2016).

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, the set of issues and the special question that this paper has touched upon will be discussed below. The process of studding in this paper shows that Islamic Revolution of Iran as a unique phenomenon in the region had so many effects on the minority population of Shia in the other countries. After Islamic Revolution, while the Saudis tried to stop and limit the rising power of Islamic Republic of Iran and the Shiites outside the kingdom in the region, they tried to keep an ever-watchful eye over their own Shiite population inside the country.

Because The Saudis and the Iranians historically have a long time enmity, and sometimes special periods of good relations, Shiites in this country have often found themselves caught in the middle of this complicated situation. While they have been the object of Saudi persecution and disdain, at the same time they were the subject of Iranian recruitment to subvert the Saudi regime. Many events after Islamic Revolution affected Shiites in Saudi Arabia, events like War between Iran and Iraq, Persian war and occupation of Iraq, the events of September 11 in 2001, activities of Islamic extremists in the region, Saudi Arabia policy against the Shiites inside and outside of the country, Islamic Republic of Iran's support of Islamic movements and many other events that had their special effect on Shiites socio- political situation in Saudi Arabia. But the most important note is that Iran's notions and political point of views have always had its reflections on Shiites socio- political conditions inside the Saudi Arabia and Shiites in this country should try not to give excuses to some influential Extremists and Islamic clerics in this country to be able to convince the government to suppress Shiites as a potential threat in the country and Shiites should emphasize their commitment to national unity and rejection of violence to show their benevolent notions and point of views.

While Saudi Arabia tries to deal with the Shiites through security suppression, censorship but have only intensified resentment of Shia. Unless the Shia see tangible improvements in their socio-economic conditions, the unrest caused by them will decrees and the best long-term solution to the issue of Saudi Arabia's Shia opposition is tangible and comprehensive reform, in order to improve the conditions of Shia Muslims and make counterbalances the inequities of inherent discrimination.

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