بررسی اثر مسابقة ارتقا برافزایش بهره‌وری نیروی کار در بنگاه‌ها(نمونه موردی: شرکت کاله آمل )
الموضوعات :
راضیه کاردگر
1
(دانشجوی دکتری علوم اقتصادی، دانشکده اقتصاد، دانشگاه مازندران، مازندران، ایران)
قهرمان عبدلی
2
(استاد گروه اقتصاد، دانشکده اقتصاد، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران)
محمدحسین دهقانی فیروزآبادی
3
(استادیار گروه اقتصاد، دانشکده اقتصاد، دانشگاه تهران)
الکلمات المفتاحية: اطلاعات نامتقارن, تئوری مسابقه, جایزه, تلاش نیروی کار,
ملخص المقالة :
یکی از ابزارهای رایج کارفرمایان برای ایجاد انگیزه در کارگران جهت تلاش بیشتر و برطرف کردن یادگیری نامتقارن تئوری مسابقه است که با ساختاربندی دستمزد به دنبال بررسی چگونگی تأثیر ساختار دستمزد و پاداش برای ایجاد انگیزه در نیروی کار به‌منظور افزایش عملکرد آنان است. هدف پژوهش حاضر استفاده از تئوری مسابقه برای ایجاد انگیزه در کارگران ایرانی و افزایش سطح فعالیت آنها برای ارتقای عملکرد بنگاه‌های کشور است. برای پاسخ‌گویی به سؤالات تحقیق از مدل مسابقه چندنفره (Multiperson Tournament) با در نظر گرفتن n کارگروn جایزه (پاداش) استفاده شد که در آن سطح تلاش معیاری از بهره‌وری و عملکرد نیروی کار فرض شده است. شیوه طراحی ساختار جایزه به‌گونه‌ای است که بعد از مشاهده میزان تولید کارگران، افراد با تلاش بیشتر با یک ضریبی جایزه بیشتر و افراد باقی‌مانده جایزه کمتری را دریافت می‌کنند. برای گردآوری داده‌ها با استفاده از ابزار پرسشنامه عملکرد طرح‌های متفاوتی از مسابقه ارتقا بر گروهی از کارکنان شرکت کاله در سال 1395 مورد ارزیابی قرار گرفت. نتایج پژوهش نشان داد که اندازه مسابقه در صورت ثبات ساختارِ جایزه تأثیری بر تلاش نیروی کار نداشته است. همچنین ساختار جایزه نیز بر تلاش کارگران بی‌تأثیر است. بنابراین این دو روش (اندازه مسابقه و ساختار جایزه) نمی‌توانند به‌عنوان ابزاری برای ایجاد انگیزه در جهت افزایش عملکرد مورداستفاده قرار گیرند. از طرفی با توجه به وجود هزینه ثابت برای اجرای مسابقات، بنگاه‌ها مسابقه‌های بزرگ‌تر را ترجیح خواهند داد.
Auronen, A .(2003). Asymmetric Information: Theory and Applications, Seminar in Strategy and International Business, Helsinki University of Technology Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, 1-35.
Audas, R., Barmby, T., & Treble, J. (2004). Luck, effort, and reward in an organizational hierarchy, Journal of Labor Economics, 22(2), 379–396.
Baker, G. P., Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1988). Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory. The Journal of Finance, 43(3), 593-616.
Bognanno, M., & Melero, E. (2015). Promotion Signals, Experience, and Education. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 25(1), 111-132.
Chang, C., & Wang, Y. (1996). Human Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited. Journal of Labor Economics, 14(3), 505-519.
Connelly, L ., Tihanyi , L ., Crook , T ., & Gangloff , A .(2014). Tournament Theory: Thirty Years of Contests and Competitions, Journal of Management, 40(1), 16– 47.
DeVaro, J. & Kauhanen , A.(2016), An “Opposing Responses” Test of Classic versus Market-Based Promotion Tournaments ,Journal of Labor Economics, 34(3), 747-779.
DeVaro, J.& Waldman. M. (2012), “The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and
Empirical Evidence,” Journal of Labor Economics, 30(1), 91-147.
Drago, R., & Garvey, G. T. (1998). Incentives for helping on the job: theory and evidence, Journal of Labor Economics, 16(1), 1-25.
Ekinci, E. (2011). Bonus Payments in a Corporate Hierarchy: Theory and Evidence, Mimeo, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 1-54.
Ekinci, E. & Waldman, M.(2015). Bonuses and promotion tournaments: Theory and evidence, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 1-65.
Flabbi, L. & Andrea, I.( 2001). Productivity, seniority and wages: New evidence from personnel data. Labour Economics 8(3), 359–387.
Josse, D., Dur, R., Non, A., & Verbeke., W.( 2015). The effects of prize spread and noise in elimination tournaments: A natural field experiment. Journal of Labor Economics 33(3), 521–569.
Garvey, G., & Swan, P. L. (1992). Managerial objectives, capital structure, and the provision of work incentives. Journal of Labor Economics, 10(4), 357-379.
Gibbons, R., & Katz, F. (1991). Layoffs and lemons. Journal of Labor Economics, 9(4), 351-380
Gibbons, R. S., & Waldman, M. (2003). Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics inside Firms. Unpublished paper, 24(1), 59-107.
Ghosh, S., & Waldman, M. (2010). Standard promotion practices versus up-or-out contracts, The Rand Journal of Economics, 41(2), 301-325
Green, J. R., & Nancy L. S. (1983). A comparison of tournaments and contracts. Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), 349-364
Gürtler, O., & Münster, J. (2010). Sabotage in dynamic tournaments, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 46(2), 179–190.
Habib Pour Getabi, K., & Safarishali, R. (2012). Comprehensive Manual for Using SPSS In Survey Researches, second edition, Loye publishing, (In Persian).
Herbertz, C., & Sliwka, D. (2013). When higher prizes lead to lower efforts- The impact of favoritism in tornament, Economics letters, 120(2), 188-191
Ivankovic .M. (2007). The tournament model: an empirical investigation of the ATP Tour, Journal of Economics and Business, 25(1), 83-111
Kahn, L.B. (2013). Asymmetric Information between Employers, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5(4), 165-205.
Kar. S. & Datta, D. (2015). Asymmetric Information in the Labor Market, Volume 25 of the series India Studies in Business and Economics, 1-38.
Kato, T. & Long, C. (2011). Tournament and managerial incentives in china’s listed firms: New evidence, China Economic Review, 22(1), 1-10.
Lazear, E. P. (1989). Pay Equality and Industrial Politics, Journal of Political Economy, 97(3), 561-80.
Lazear, E.P. & Rosen, S. (1981). Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor, Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 841-864.
Lazear, E. and P. Oyer (2012), “Personnel Economics, “ in R. Gibbons and J. Roberts (eds.), The Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press, pp. 479-519.
Meyer, M. A. (1992). Biased contests and moral hazard: implications for career profiles, Annales d' Economie et de Statistique, 25(26), 165–187
Orrison, A., Schotter, A., & Weigelt, K. (2004). Multiperson Tournaments: An Experimental Examination, Journal of Management Science, 50(2), 268-279.
O'Keefe, M., Viscusi, K., & Zeckhauser, R. (1984). Economic contests: Comparative reward schemes. Journal of Labor Economics, 2(1), 27-56.
Reiss, R. D. (1989). Approximate Distributions of Order Statistics, Springer, New York, 1-44.
Schonberg, U.) 2007. (Testing for Asymmetric Employer Learning, Journal of Labor Economics, )25), 651-691.
Sunde, U. (2003). Potential, Prizes and Performance: Testing Tournament Theory with Professional Tennis Data, Journal of Applied Economics, 41(25), 3199-3208.
Waldman, M. (2013). Classic promotion tournaments versus market-based tournaments, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31(3), 198-210.
Zabojnik, J., & Bernhardt, D. (2001). Corporate tournaments, human capital acquisition, and the firm size-wage relation. Review of Economic Studies, 68(3), 693–716.
Zhang, Y.) 2007(. Employer Learning Under Asymmetric Information: The Role of Job Mobility, Mimeo, Indiana University Purdue University (IUPUI), 1-42.
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Auronen, A .(2003). Asymmetric Information: Theory and Applications, Seminar in Strategy and International Business, Helsinki University of Technology Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, 1-35.
Audas, R., Barmby, T., & Treble, J. (2004). Luck, effort, and reward in an organizational hierarchy, Journal of Labor Economics, 22(2), 379–396.
Baker, G. P., Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1988). Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory. The Journal of Finance, 43(3), 593-616.
Bognanno, M., & Melero, E. (2015). Promotion Signals, Experience, and Education. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 25(1), 111-132.
Chang, C., & Wang, Y. (1996). Human Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited. Journal of Labor Economics, 14(3), 505-519.
Connelly, L ., Tihanyi , L ., Crook , T ., & Gangloff , A .(2014). Tournament Theory: Thirty Years of Contests and Competitions, Journal of Management, 40(1), 16– 47.
DeVaro, J. & Kauhanen , A.(2016), An “Opposing Responses” Test of Classic versus Market-Based Promotion Tournaments ,Journal of Labor Economics, 34(3), 747-779.
DeVaro, J.& Waldman. M. (2012), “The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and
Empirical Evidence,” Journal of Labor Economics, 30(1), 91-147.
Drago, R., & Garvey, G. T. (1998). Incentives for helping on the job: theory and evidence, Journal of Labor Economics, 16(1), 1-25.
Ekinci, E. (2011). Bonus Payments in a Corporate Hierarchy: Theory and Evidence, Mimeo, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 1-54.
Ekinci, E. & Waldman, M.(2015). Bonuses and promotion tournaments: Theory and evidence, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 1-65.
Flabbi, L. & Andrea, I.( 2001). Productivity, seniority and wages: New evidence from personnel data. Labour Economics 8(3), 359–387.
Josse, D., Dur, R., Non, A., & Verbeke., W.( 2015). The effects of prize spread and noise in elimination tournaments: A natural field experiment. Journal of Labor Economics 33(3), 521–569.
Garvey, G., & Swan, P. L. (1992). Managerial objectives, capital structure, and the provision of work incentives. Journal of Labor Economics, 10(4), 357-379.
Gibbons, R., & Katz, F. (1991). Layoffs and lemons. Journal of Labor Economics, 9(4), 351-380
Gibbons, R. S., & Waldman, M. (2003). Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics inside Firms. Unpublished paper, 24(1), 59-107.
Ghosh, S., & Waldman, M. (2010). Standard promotion practices versus up-or-out contracts, The Rand Journal of Economics, 41(2), 301-325
Green, J. R., & Nancy L. S. (1983). A comparison of tournaments and contracts. Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), 349-364
Gürtler, O., & Münster, J. (2010). Sabotage in dynamic tournaments, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 46(2), 179–190.
Habib Pour Getabi, K., & Safarishali, R. (2012). Comprehensive Manual for Using SPSS In Survey Researches, second edition, Loye publishing, (In Persian).
Herbertz, C., & Sliwka, D. (2013). When higher prizes lead to lower efforts- The impact of favoritism in tornament, Economics letters, 120(2), 188-191
Ivankovic .M. (2007). The tournament model: an empirical investigation of the ATP Tour, Journal of Economics and Business, 25(1), 83-111
Kahn, L.B. (2013). Asymmetric Information between Employers, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5(4), 165-205.
Kar. S. & Datta, D. (2015). Asymmetric Information in the Labor Market, Volume 25 of the series India Studies in Business and Economics, 1-38.
Kato, T. & Long, C. (2011). Tournament and managerial incentives in china’s listed firms: New evidence, China Economic Review, 22(1), 1-10.
Lazear, E. P. (1989). Pay Equality and Industrial Politics, Journal of Political Economy, 97(3), 561-80.
Lazear, E.P. & Rosen, S. (1981). Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor, Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 841-864.
Lazear, E. and P. Oyer (2012), “Personnel Economics, “ in R. Gibbons and J. Roberts (eds.), The Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press, pp. 479-519.
Meyer, M. A. (1992). Biased contests and moral hazard: implications for career profiles, Annales d' Economie et de Statistique, 25(26), 165–187
Orrison, A., Schotter, A., & Weigelt, K. (2004). Multiperson Tournaments: An Experimental Examination, Journal of Management Science, 50(2), 268-279.
O'Keefe, M., Viscusi, K., & Zeckhauser, R. (1984). Economic contests: Comparative reward schemes. Journal of Labor Economics, 2(1), 27-56.
Reiss, R. D. (1989). Approximate Distributions of Order Statistics, Springer, New York, 1-44.
Schonberg, U.) 2007. (Testing for Asymmetric Employer Learning, Journal of Labor Economics, )25), 651-691.
Sunde, U. (2003). Potential, Prizes and Performance: Testing Tournament Theory with Professional Tennis Data, Journal of Applied Economics, 41(25), 3199-3208.
Waldman, M. (2013). Classic promotion tournaments versus market-based tournaments, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31(3), 198-210.
Zabojnik, J., & Bernhardt, D. (2001). Corporate tournaments, human capital acquisition, and the firm size-wage relation. Review of Economic Studies, 68(3), 693–716.
Zhang, Y.) 2007(. Employer Learning Under Asymmetric Information: The Role of Job Mobility, Mimeo, Indiana University Purdue University (IUPUI), 1-42.
