Comprehension of factual, nonfactual, and counterfactual conditionals by Iranian EFL learners
الموضوعات : نشریه مطالعات آموزش زبان انگلیسی
Fatemeh Moeini
1
(Islamic Azad University, Takestan Branch)
الکلمات المفتاحية: subjunctive mood, conditional reasoning, indicative mood, factuals, nonfactuals, counterfa,
ملخص المقالة :
A considerable amount of studies have been established on conditional reasoning supporting mental model theory of propositional reasoning. Mental model theory proposed by Johnson- larid and Byrne is an explanation of someone's thought process about how something occurs in the real world. Conditional reasoning as a kind of reasoning is the way to speak about possibilities or probabilities. The aim of present study was to investigate comprehension of English factual, nonfactual, and counterfactual structures by Iranian EFL learners advocating mental model theory of propositional reasoning. To this end 68 learners studying EFL in 4 language centers participated in the study. A consistency judgment test adopted from Byrne & Tasso (2002) was administered to determine comprehension of 3 English conditional types in indicative vs. subjunctive mood, and past or present tense aspect i.e. Factual, nonfactual, and counterfactual structures. The data were analyzed through a repeated measure one-way ANOVA. The result showed that when participants encountered factual conditional having a general knowledge that it is real, possible and very likely to fulfill, build a mental model of its premises and are more likely to perceive that indicative conditional is consistent with the truth of antecedent and consequent(TA-TC). Also when encountering a nonfactual or counterfactual conditional in subjunctive mood having a general knowledge that it is very unlikely or impossible to fulfill, participants build a mental model of its premises, and are more likely to perceive that subjunctive conditional is consistent with the falsity of antecedent and consequent(FA-FC).
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