According to Agency Theory and Neoclassical Theory; New Ownership and Diversity of Public Sector Companies in Corporate Life Cycle

الموضوعات :

Abdollah Tavasoli ¹ (Department of Accounting, Ali Abad Katoul Branch, Islamic Azad University, Ali Abad Katoul, Iran.)
Parviz Saeidi ² (Department of Accounting, Ali Abad Katoul Branch, Islamic Azad University, Ali Abad Katoul, Iran)
Bahram Biglari ³ (Department of Business and Economic, Linnaeus University, Växjö, Sweden.)

تاريخ الإرسال : 02 الإثنين , رجب, 1439 تاريخ التأكيد : 02 الإثنين , رجب, 1439 تاريخ الإصدار : 13 الخميس , جمادى الثانية, 1439

الکلمات المفتاحية: Seizing assets, Assuming ownership, Corporate Life Cycle, Agency Theory, Neoclassical Theory,

ملخص المقالة :

The purpose of this study is investigating and determining rate of seizing assets and acquisition other companies by public sector companies. We estimate this rate at various stages of the life cycle of the company. Therefore, according to their size and age, the companies have been divided into small, large, young, and mature groups, and for this purpose, we have collected data from a sample of 45 companies of the public sector from three Iranian provinces. We have tested our analyses from the viewpoints of agency and neoclassical theories and discussed the results of the independent t tests. The results showed that with increase in age and size, public sector companies are more likely to seize the fixed assets of other companies to restructure and achieve improved operations. However, in the case of assuming ownership of other companies done through buying the companies, most public sector companies do this in the middle of their lifetime and in the course of their growth.

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