بررسی اثر تنوع‌گرایی دارایی و تسهیلات بانک‌ها بر ریسک بانکی (مورد مطالعه: بانک‌های خصوصی در ایران)
الموضوعات : دانش سرمایه‌گذاری
موسی بزرگ اصل
1
(استادیار، گروه مدیریت مالی وحسابداری ،دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، (نویسنده مسئول))
علیرضا اکبری ماسوله
2
(دانشجوی دکتری مدیریت مالی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران)
محمد جواد محقق نیا
3
(استادیار، گروه بانکداری اسلامی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران)
محمد تقی تقوی فرد
4
(دانشیار، گروه مدیریت صنعتی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران)
الکلمات المفتاحية: ریسک بانکی, تنوع‌گرایی, شاخص هرفیندال هریشمن,
ملخص المقالة :
مبحث تنوع گرایی و ریسک بانکی یکی از موضوعات مهم در عرصه ادبیات بانکی است. این مقاله به بررسی این موضوع می پردازد که اثر تنوع گرایی در بخش دارایی ها و ارائه تسهیلات در بخش های مختلف اقتصادی چه اثری بر ریسک دارد. دارایی ها بر اساس تقسیم چهارگانه دارایی ها به جز تسهیلات شامل دارایی ثابت، اوراق بهادار ،سرمایه گذاری و تسهیلات اعطایی براساس بخش های اقتصادی که شامل کشاورزی ،صنعت و معدن ،ساختمان و مسکن، بازرگانی ،خدمات و صادرات می باشد. برای بررسی این موضوع بانک های فعال در بورس اوراق بهادارتهران شامل 12 بانک ملت، صادرات، تجارت، پارسیان، اقتصادنوین، پاسارگاد، سینا، حکمت، دی، سرمایه، پست بانک، کارآفرین، مورد بررسی قرار گرفتند.دوره مورد بررسی این مطالعه سال های 1390 تا 1394 را در برمی گیرد همچنین برای تحلیل داده ها از داده های ترکیبی و یک مدل پنل برای بررسی رابطه ریسک و تنوع گرایی استفاده گردید. نتایج حاصل از برآورد مدل نشان داد که رابطه مثبت و معنی داری بین تمرکز گرایی و ریسک بانکی وجود دارد که تاییدکننده ی نظریات مرسوم در حوزه بانکداری در زمینه ریسک و تنوع گرایی است و همچنین دلالت سیاستی مبنی بر متنوع سازی بانک ها در زمینه دارایی و ارائه تسهیلات برای مواجه با ریسک کمتر دارد.
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