بررسی راهبردهای امنیتی و دفاعی ایران و عربستان سعودی در منطقه خاورمیانه(2005-2021)
محورهای موضوعی : خاورمیانه
محمد کمرروستا
1
*
,
سعید مقیمی
2
,
میرابراهیم صدیق
3
1 -
2 - استادیار و عضو هیات علمی دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه آزاد کرج
3 - دانشکده حقوق علوم سیاسی،دانشگاه آزاد واحد کرج،ایران
کلید واژه: ایران, عربستان سعودی, راهبرد دفاعی, سیاست خارجی, امنیت ملی,
چکیده مقاله :
یکی از تجربه های تاریخی بشرکه منجر به فهم و ادراک مشترک نسبت به موضوع سیاست خارجی شده است،این است که اقتدار نظامی،لازمه یک سیاست خارجی مؤثر و کارآمد است.در واقع از یک کشور با پایه های ضعیف نظامی و دفاعی و ناتوان در تامین منافع ملی خود، نمی توان انتظار یک سیاست خارجی با نفوذ و ایفای نقش مؤثر در عرصه بین الملل را داشت.
با عنایت به رابطه متقابل سیاست خارجی و استراتژی های امنیتی و دفاعی کشورها و اهمیت ایران و عربستان به عنوان قدرت های برتر منطقه بحران زا و چالش آفرین خاورمیانه،این مقاله در مورد محرک ها، اصول و مبانی سیاست خارجی و راهبردهای دفاعی ایران و عربستان سعودی و تصورات هر یک از آنها از تهدید صحبت می کند.
نتیجه گیری اصلی این مقاله این است که ایران با راهبرد برون مرزی بازدارندگی در مقابل تهدیداتی نظیر آمریکا، اسرائیل وعربستان و تروریسم داعش جهت حفظ و تقویت عمق استراتژیک و حفظ امنیت داخلی خود،استراتژی منسجمی در قبال منطقه خاورمیانه دارد اما عربستان سعودی هیچ استراتژی منسجمی در قبال منطقه ندارد و از استراتژی خرید وفاداری برای افزایش وفاداری کشورهای عرب و سنی منطقه استفاده کرده است.
One of the historical experiences of mankind that has led to a common understanding of foreign policy is that military authority is necessary for an effective and efficient foreign policy.In fact, a country with weak military and defense foundations and unable to secure its national interests cannot be expected to have an influential foreign policy and play an effective role in the international arena.
Considering the mutual relationship between foreign policy and the security and defense strategies of countries and the importance of Iran and Saudi Arabia as the top powers of the crisis-causing and challenging region of the Middle East, this article is about the drivers, principles and foundations of foreign policy and defense strategies of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia and the imagination of each of them speaks of the threat.
The main conclusion of this article is that Iran has a coherent strategy towards the Middle East region with its cross-border strategy of deterrence against threats such as America, Israel and Arabia and ISIS terrorism in order to maintain and strengthen its strategic depth and maintain its internal security, but Saudi Arabia has no coherent strategy. It has no interest in the region and has used the strategy of buying loyalty to increase the loyalty of Arab and Sunni countries in the region.
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