کنفوسیوس‌گرایی و دکترین سیاست خارجی چین
محورهای موضوعی : فصلنامه علمی تحقیقات سیاسی و بین المللیشهروز شریعتی 1 , سیده سارا موسوی 2
1 - گروه علوم سیاسی/ دانشگاه تربیت مدرس
2 - گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس
کلید واژه: فرهنگ, قدرت نرم, چین, کنفوسیوس, مؤسسات کنفوسیوس,
چکیده مقاله :
رشد کم‌نظیر مدارس کنفوسیوسی از سال 2004 در سراسر جهان بیانگر برنامه‌ای هدفمند از سوی جمهوری خلق چین به شمار می‌رود. رهبران چین در دهه 1980 پس از درک این مقوله که ایدئولوژی کمونیسم دیگر جذابیت چندانی برای حضور قدرتمند چین در عرصه بین‌المللی ندارد، کوشیدند با استفاده از عنوان کنفوسیوس مسیر جدیدی را برای دستیابی به آرمان‌های ملت چین بازطراحی کنند. رهبران چین، همچنین در این چارچوب با استفاده از اعتبار تاریخی کنفوسیوس اقدام به توسعه مدارس و مؤسساتی کردند که باهدف ترویج زبان و فرهنگ چینی در سراسر جهان گسترش یافته است. این مقاله ضمن بررسی برنامه‌های دولت چین برای ترویج مدارس کنفوسیوس در قالب روش‌شناسی نگرشی و با روش روند پژوهی، می‌کوشد تا به این پرسش پاسخ دهد که مدارس کنفوسیوس چه نقشی را در پیشبرد اهداف هژمونیک رهبران چین در جهان ایفا می‌کنند؟ مقاله در پاسخ به پرسش مذکور با بررسی چگونگی و درعین‌حال روند گسترش مؤسسات کنفوسیوسی در جهان این فرضیه را مورد آزمون قرار می‌دهد که توسعه مدارس کنفوسیوس در چارچوب دکترین خیزش صلح‌آمیز چین و باهدف زمینه‌سازی برای استقرار نظم نوین جهانی بر مبنای قدرت نرم چین صورت می‌پذیرد.
The remarkable growth of Confucian institutes and schools around the world since 2004 has been a sign of the rise of the People's Republic of China. Chinese leaders in the 1980s, after realizing that Communism was no longer attractive for a powerful international presence, sought to redesign the Confucius as a way to achieve the aspirations of the Chinese people. Today, the word “Confucius” by the Chinese government, refers to cultural institutions that are aimed at promoting Chinese language and culture throughout the world. This paper attempts to examine the Chinese government's plans to promote Confucius schools by using a descriptive and analytical way and tries to answer the question of what role do Confucius schools play in promoting the hegemonic goals of Chinese leaders around the world? The paper, examining the performance of these institutions, shows that "Confucian institutions strive to develop Chinese culture and literature for establishing the basis of a Chinese-led soft power in the framework of the world order." The article also shows that the establishment of these institutions is a deliberate move by Beijing's leaders to develop cultural hegemony and expand China's power and influence in the world.
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